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Israeli Political Options After the Vote"
The Consensus and Its Implications The Prime Minister’s plan was just one out of many versions that articulate what the majority of Jews in Israel regard as a reasonable solution to the on-going conflict. The broadlines of this consensus are as follows:
In other words, fragments amounting to 10% of historical Palestine will be called Palestine: a geo-political entity that will not have independent foreign, defense, or financial policies and that will be composed of two huge prison camps. This vision, which has no Palestinian partner and is rejected by some European countries, was endorsed by the Bush Administration. The U.S. Administration’s endorsement and the fact that the vision reflects an internal Jewish consensus means that the outcome of the internal political game will have little bearing on the prospects of peace in Israel and Palestine. In other words, whoever forms the next government, Israel’s policy on the Palestine question will be the same, whether the plan is pushed forward by the Likud and its allies (the center party Shinui, the National Religious Party, the ultra Orthodox parties and the Russian immigrant parties) or by the Labor party and its allies, which are fewer in number and consist mainly of moderate national religious partners. As noted above, the Israeli consensus is opposed by the extreme right wing, which refuses to give up even Gaza or the rest of the West Bank.
Obstacles to Leftwing Alliances with Israel’s Palestinians To the left of Labor, there are two political blocs which have for the past five years been totally excluded from a significant role in the political game. They may prove relevant in a distant future if the regional or global balance of powers forces Israel to change its policies. One is the newly formed collation Yahad (together), which is made up of old, veteran mini-parties that were generally known as the Israeli peace camp. Each of these groups calls, in its own way, for an end of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the creation of a Palestinian State. The Yahad group, which were behind the Geneva Accords, account for an insignificant share of the Jewish vote in Israeli elections. Yahad’s ability to affect the future political scene depends on an alliance with the Palestinians in Israel, who constitute almost 20% of the population. This alliance is impossible for several reasons. Firstly, within the left Zionist bloc there are elements that still hesitate to fully legitimize Palestinian participation in Israel’s foreign and defense policies. Secondly, the Palestinian minority in Israel has been torn by internal ideological divisions in the past few years. There are three main orientations: the Islamist movement, the nationalist bloc, and the Communist party. Although they all share a national platform, their different orientations have made it hard for them to act jointly in an effective manner and it requires great efforts to maintain a joint agenda against the state’s policies of discrimination and exclusion. They are also divided by personal ambitions and rivalries. Thirdly, while the Palestinian political parties still endorse the two state solution as envisaged by Yahad, they find it hard to support a future peace that does not provide a solution for the refugee problem. This position was made clear in the massive turnout at the first ever Right of Return conference in Haifa in March 2004. The Right of Return conference was organized by several non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and brought together 300 people for a two-day session. While the majority of the participants were Palestinian Israelis, there was also a considerable presence of Jews. The conference ended in a statement that was termed the Haifa initiative (later suppported by other groups including the American Green Party). The statement reiterated the commiment a long list of NGOs inside Israel to the Palestinian Right of Return and declared the fullfilment of this Right as the only way towards a lasting and comprehenisve peace in the Middle East.
Growing Gap Between Politicians and People It is worth noting the growing gap between the politics of segregation preached by the elites represented in the Likkud-Labor-Yahad triangle in Israel and the Palestinian authority in the Occupied Territories, on the one hand, and the strong undercurrents promoting cohabitation in civil society on both sides. These sentiments stem more from frustration and a sense of coercion rather than altruism. They are manifested in the mushrooming of bilingual schools in Israel and the re-surfacing of the one state discourse in Palestine. In the long run, this could influence the political elites, but probably - and unfortunately - only after more cycles of violence and bloodshed. The crux of the matter is that Jewish elite politics in Israel are driven by a sense of having carte blanche from the U.S., the only international player that counts in Israel’s eyes. As a result, unilateralism is increasingly popular: take as much of Palestine as possible with as few Palestinians as possible. Since additional territory entails including more Palestinians in the Jewish State, it is no wonder that support for their expulsion – an idea once located on the margins of the political system – is now acceptable discourse among mainstream Israeli academics and politicos. To prevent the real possibility of transfer, the international community will have to increase the pressure on Israel to move towards a peace that is acceptable not just by the majority of Israelis but also the majority of Palestinians. The question is whether the present global and regional balance of power allows for such pressure. Put differently, are the Israelis right in thinking they can get away with both unilateral annexation of territory - disguised as withdrawal as in the Sharon plan – as well as the mass transfer of the Palestinian population? Dr. Ilan Pappe is a Senior Lecturer in Political Science at Haifa University. His recent books include The Israel/Palestine Question (London, 1999). The Palestine Center is the education arm of the Jerusalem Fund for Education and Community Development. The above text does not necessarily reflect the views of the Palestine Center or the Jerusalem Fund. This Information Brief may be used without permission but with proper attribution to the Palestine Center. |
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