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As Quartet Meets, Ghosts of Peace Plans Past
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Information Brief # 104, by Casey Patrick Reilly
Washington DC, May 3, 2004
Contact persons:
Casey Patrick Reilly, Analyst, 202.338.1290, creilly@palestinecenter.org
Nadia Hijab, Executive Director, 202.338.1958, nadiahijab@palestinecenter.org
Samar Assad, Senior Analyst, 202.338.1290, sassad@palestinecenter.org
The Quartet, which consists of Middle East policy representatives from the United States, the European Union (E.U.), Russia and the United Nations, is slated to meet again on May 4 in New York to "give a new impulse to the peace process" according to the E.U. foreign policy chief Javier Solana.
The U.N. envoy to the Middle East, Terje Roed-Larsen, said the Quartet would discuss placing an "international presence" in the Gaza Strip if the proposed Israeli withdrawal occurs. Both Solana and U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan affirmed that issues of final borders between a Palestinian state and Israel, and the return of Palestinian refugees should be negotiated between the Palestinians and Israelis themselves - in contrast to U.S. President George W. Bush's April 15 agreement with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon that political "realities" have already decided these issues.
The Road Map
Under the auspices of the Quartet, the "performance-based" Road Map was released on May 1, 2003. The Road Map requires both sides to take reciprocal steps in the political, security, and economic spheres leading to a negotiated final and comprehensive solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by 2005. Both sides were required to complete a series of steps simultaneously. In the first phase Israel was required to:
Stop all violence and incitement against Palestinians,
Remove all settlements built since the Sharon government took power and halt all settlement construction, including "natural growth" and
Refrain from destroying or confiscating any Palestinian lands or property, whether "as a punitive measure or to facilitate Israeli construction."
The Palestinian Authority was called on to accomplish the following:
End all violence and terror against Israel,
Take visible steps to dismantle groups that participate in violent resistance, and
Reform the governing structure of the PA.
Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat appointed a Prime Minister as per the Road Map instructions. Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) successfully secured a ceasefire by all Palestinian militant groups in the summer of 2003, which saw 55 days without attacks against Israeli civilians.
Israel continued to confiscate lands to build its Wall on the West Bank, "in flagrant breach of commitments under the US-led road map to peace."(1) For example, on 5 July Israel confiscated "approximately 100 dunums of agricultural land…from the residents of Bakka Ash-Sharkiya," and on 12 July it began "the construction of a new settlement road near Beit Lahiya, and the construction of a new outpost near Salam, Nablus."(2) Israel also continued its policy of extra-judicial assassinations of Palestinian militants.
Abu Mazen resigned in frustration at the lack of progress and Ahmed Qurei (Abu Ala') was named the new Prime Minister.
The Fate of Previous Plans
The Road Map was the latest in a decade of efforts to support Palestinian-Israeli negotiations that shared similar features: an end to Israeli settlement activity as a prelude to its withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 War, and commitment by Palestinians to security measures.
The Oslo Accords, the first of which was signed on the White House lawn on 13 September 1993 presented a framework to reach final status negotiations and was scheduled for completion in 1998. The Oslo Accords sidestepped the negotiations that had been launched between Arabs and Israelis at Madrid in 1991, in the wake of the first Gulf war.
The Mitchell Commission report was issued in May 2001 and reaffirmed the call for an end to Israel's settlement construction.
After these plans brought little progress, several Palestinians and Israelis civilians came together to attempt to break the diplomatic deadlock. For example, former negotiators published the Geneva Accord in December of 2003, which outlined what a final settlement acceptable to both sides might look like.
Reasons for Failure
When it reconvenes, the Quartet should consider the reasons why the above efforts ended in failure. The initiatives shared some major flaws:
The agreements had the net effect of making Palestinians living under occupation responsible for the security of the occupying Israeli soldiers and settlers, an impossible objective to achieve.
The agreements made Israel's withdrawal from occupied territory conditional on agreement on a final settlement, although U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 was clear on the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war."
In negotiations between an occupier and an occupied the balance of power will always be in favor of the occupier. The Palestinians were powerless to end Israeli settlement activity and land confiscation; nor did the international community back its words with action.
The failure of the decade-long peace process has brought trust and the possibility of coexistence to its lowest point ever. "The way forward requires withdrawal from occupied territory - not just Gaza but also the West Bank and East Jerusalem," said Palestine Center Director Nadia Hijab, "followed by negotiations on final status issues based on existing U.N. resolutions, beginning with the U.N. Partition Plan of 1947." U.N. Resolution 181, which is the basis for international recognition of Israel, provided for a Jewish State and an Arab State in Palestine, dividing the land almost equally between them. As Bush and Sharon pointed out in their most recent press conference, the 1967 borders are simply armistice lines drawn between warring armies in 1949, and there is no obligation to use these lines a basis for a final settlement.
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(1) Chris McGreal, The Guardian, 3 July 2003.
(2) http://www.palestinemonitor.org/updates/Israeli%20violations%20of%20Road%20Map.htm
The Palestine Center is the education arm of the Jerusalem Fund for Education and Community Development. The above text does not necessarily reflect the views of the Palestine Center or the Jerusalem Fund. This Information Brief may be used without permission but with proper attribution to the Palestine Center.
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