" The Territorial Implications of Sharon’s ‘Disengagement Plan’
Geoffrey Aronson

Overview:

Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon is seriously contemplating the evacuation of a number of functioning settlements located in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Sharon’s consideration of settlement evacuation represents a significant watershed in the history of Israel’s occupation of these lands conquered in June 1967. A strict analysis of the territorial implications of such a policy offers an opportunity to address the relevance of such a move to the prospects for creating a viable Palestinian national existence in territories evacuated by Israel.

Published reports since the beginning of 2004 present two related options for settlement evacuation. The first option includes the evacuation of the settlements of Ganim, Kadim, Homesh, and Sa Nur in the West Bank, and the settlements of Netzarim, Kfar Darom, and Morag in the Gaza Strip. The second option, published in Israel’s English-language Ha’aretz newspaper on 2 February, highlights Sharon’s decision to initiate the planning of the evacuation of the Gaza Strip’s entire complement of settlements.

The West Bank Settlements:

Ganim and Kadim are two small settlements located southeast of the Palestinian city of Jenin along the northernmost section of the road from the town of Tubas. According to the latest official figures (December 2002) Ganim has a population of 170; Kadim has a population of 149. In addition, an Israeli military base located to the south of the settlements has recently been relocated closer to the Green Line.

To the southwest, Homesh and Sa Nur abut a section of Route 60 southwest of Jenin along what has historically been the principal transport route linking Jenin with the West Bank’s major Palestinian urban and commercial markets. Both are sparsely populated; Homesh has 198 inhabitants, Sa Nur has 33.

Israel’s evacuation of these four settlements and the nearby military base as well as another near the Palestinian village of Sa Nur—whose security rationale would be undermined by the settlements’ evacuation—would have a limited local impact on the region north of Nablus. It would mark a restoration of Palestinian control over Jenin’s historic territorial hinterland reaching the Green Line region to the north; Ya’abad and the outskirts of Tulkarm to the west; Nablus to the south; and Tammun and Tubas to the east. This bloc however would remain without the vital transportation links necessary to enhance the value of its territorial continuity. This region’s development and management of everyday life would remain constrained by the continuing presence of settlements and associated checkpoints along major roads—including Shavei Shomron, Enav and Aveni Hefetz obstructing the route to Tulkarm and Nablus; Elon Moreh to Nablus’east; an Israeli army facility overlooking Nablus from the northeast; and the separation barrier to its west near the Mevo Dotan, Hinnanit, and Shaked settlements.

The Gaza Strip Settlements:

The settlements of Netzarim, Kfar Darom, and Morag are integral parts of a territorial strategy aiming at assuring Israeli control over the principal north-south transport route linking the major Palestinian population and commercial centers of the Gaza Strip. It is difficult to envision a continuing Israeli strategy aimed at controlling this route, which has caused such hardship to Palestinians, in the aftermath of the evacuation of these settlements. Palestinian assumption of control over Road No.4 from Erez in the north to Gaza City and south to Khan Yunis would necessarily result from an Israeli withdrawal from Netzarim—population 382 and Kfar Darom with 338 Israelis—and mark a significant improvement in the daily lives of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians. Netzarim’s evacuation, along with the considerable military facility abutting it, would further consolidate the creation of unobstructed Palestinian territorial continuity from Erez to the southern outskirts of Deir al Balah.

Morag—population 170—abuts the main road between Khan Yunis and Rafah. Its evacuation would enable the creation of a territorially cohesive bloc from the Khan Yunis-Rafah line east to the border with Israel. Israel would remain in the west along the coastal zone comprising the Katif settlement bloc as well as in control of a narrow border strip separating the Gaza Strip from Egypt.

Outcome:

As a result of this limited redeployment, Palestinians would considerably enhance their control over Gaza’s main transport linkages and expand Palestinian capacity to create in Gaza a unified and coherent territorial presence, but a significant portion of the coastal area as well as the border with Egypt would remain outside their control.

The option for the evacuation of all civilian settlement in the Gaza Strip is in some respects qualitatively different than the more limited redeployment outlined above. This option includes one settlement bloc in northwest Gaza Strip, including the settlements of Nisanit[943], Alei Sinai[360], and Dugit [76] that is territorially contiguous with Israel, and another—the Katif bloc—which houses the bulk of Gaza’s 7,000 settlers. Evacuation of these areas would restore, with one significant exception, Gaza in its entirely to Palestinian control, and provide Palestinians potentially significant agricultural, recreational, and tourist assets and qualitatively enhance the prospects for the creation in Gaza of a nationally cohesive entity.

Israel intends to remain in control of the border area separating the Gaza Strip from Egypt. Israeli control over this area has been expanded during the intifada, and it is unlikely that it will be included in any unilateral redeployment and settlement evacuation. Denying Palestinians sovereign control over this critical border significantly impairs their ability to fully exploit the advantages of an Israeli evacuation of all Gaza Strip settlements. .

Geoffrey Aronson is the Director of Research and Publications at the Foundation for Middle East Peace in Washington, DC. He is the Editor of the Foundation's bi-monthly Report on Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories. This information brief does not necessarily reflect the views of The Jerusalem Fund or the Palestine Center. The above text may be used without permission but with proper attribution to The Palestine Center.

This information first appeared in Information Brief No. 101, 18 February 2004.