The most important result of Bush’s speech is that it happened. The President put his political capital on the line in a way that he has avoided for 18 months. Grudgingly, Bush committed his presidency to finding a lasting peace between Israel and Palestine.

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Bush’s Speech:

The content of Bush’s vision for peace is unsurprising. Anyone following the conflict knows the principles upon which peace will be consummated—a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, with borders roughly those in place before the 1967 war. This is the “land for peace” formula enshrined in UN resolutions 242 and 338. Moreover, it implies sharing Jerusalem and the dismantling of most Jewish settlements illegally built in the Palestinian territories.

The most controversial aspect of Bush’s vision is his call for Palestinians to replace their leadership—meaning Palestinian Authority (PA) President Yasser Arafat—in order for the process to move forward. Bush has made no secret of his lack of trust in Arafat, and he was right to note the corruption and inefficiencies that plague the PA. Bush was also correct to suggest that Arafat has, at the least, tacitly condoned a number of suicide bombings. However, Arab commentators were quick to note that while Bush has disqualified Arafat as an interlocutor because he has “blood on his hands,” no such disqualification was made for Sharon—responsible for several infamous massacres of Arabs. The United States never disqualified former Israeli Prime Ministers Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir—early leaders of the Irgun and Stern terrorist groups—from negotiations. Such commentators quickly point out that Arafat, like Sharon, is the democratically elected leader of his people.

Bush and the Palestinians:

Jamal Khashoggi, editor of the Arab News in Saudi Arabia, believes that Bush is blaming the victims—the Palestinians under occupation—rather than blaming the oppressor. “Bush just completely adopted the Israeli analysis of the situation, that it is terror forcing Israel to maintain its occupation, not that occupation is leading to terrorism.” Such criticism does have some basis as Bush has put tremendous emphasis on “ending Palestinian terror” without evincing any understanding of the reasons why some Palestinians are driven to such desperate measures.

Palestinians have the additional burden of undertaking their responsibilities prior to any significant Israeli moves. For Bush, Palestinians must elect a “new and different leadership” and undertake far-reaching and necessary reforms in the way the PA operates prior to the United States backing a provisional Palestinian state. Only then would the United States pressure Israel to accept Palestinian statehood and take the hard decisions to finally let go of the West Bank and Gaza.

While most of Bush’s harshest comments were reserved for the Palestinians, his speech was far from a disaster for them. A number of prominent Palestinian commentators saw some genuinely positive developments in the speech. Palestinian Cabinet Secretary Ahmad Abdel Rahman praised Bush’s vision as “the first time that an American administration recognized that the only solution for this conflict is to end the occupation and to have a state live in peace beside Israel. This is a historic change in the American stand.”

There was much for Palestinians to like in Bush’s speech. Bush called for an end to Israel’s 35-year occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. This was a necessary and positive step. It reminded Americans that nine years after the Oslo Accords Israel remained in occupation of virtually all of the Palestinian lands. These are not “disputed” lands to be divided up, they are “occupied” lands that must be given over in full to Palestinian sovereignty. For Bush, it is only through the creation of a “stable, peaceful Palestinian state” that Israel’s legitimate security needs can be met. Bush called for an end to Israel’s settlement policy—intensified under Sharon—and for a withdrawal of Israeli troops from re-occupied urban areas in the West Bank to positions held in September 2000—prior to the start of the current uprising. Many Palestinians, tired of the corruption and creeping authoritarianism of the PA, have been calling for reforms for years. If the political and administrative reforms come to pass, most Palestinians will embrace them.

Bush and the Israelis:

Bush’s plan was warmly accepted by most Israelis—including the Sharon government—for obvious reasons. By placing the blame for the current state of affairs squarely on Palestinian terror, Bush appealed to strongly held Israeli views that Palestinian violence must stop before any negotiations begin. Such a sentiment, while entirely understandable in human terms, cuts against the historical grain, as virtually all anti-colonial wars were still ongoing when a political deal was cinched. That the Palestinians must undertake all of the early hard steps and only then will Israel have to respond appealed to Israel.

Israelis across the political spectrum embraced Bush’s lightly veiled call for Arafat’s removal. Arafat has been thoroughly demonized in the Israeli popular imagination. Bush’s speech led David Landau, editor of the influential Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz, to triumphantly describe Arafat as a “dead man walking” who had just been “politically assassinated by President Bush.”

For most Israelis, the hard steps that Israel will have to undertake in Bush’s vision are well known. Opinion polls in Israel consistently show that a majority of Israelis know and accept that Israel will have to withdraw to the 1967 borders, that most settlements will have to be disbanded, and that a Palestinian state will be created in the West Bank and Gaza.

Will it Work?:

While the end game—a two state solution—is by now widely accepted, the implementation of Bush’s plan will likely be problematic. Bush was short on the specifics of implementation, linkages, and schedules. The devil is in the details, and important missing details can thwart even the best of plans. Who decides if Palestinian reforms have gone far enough to necessitate Israeli concessions? Sharon’s government would just drag its heals and refuse to ever “certify” the reforms. If Bush makes that determination, will he be willing to put real pressure on Israel? Sharon’s humiliation of Bush last April should give one pause in this regard.

Bush is asking that Arafat and Sharon do things that go against their ideological core interests. Bush is asking that Arafat step aside and make himself irrelevant. How many politicians and national leaders ever voluntarily bench themselves? Not many, and Arafat has not shown himself to be the kind of statesman to consider starting a trend. As is oft observed, there are no living former presidents in the Arab world. Arafat has tenaciously clung to power, so there is no reason to believe that he will agree to Bush’s demand to leave office.

As for Sharon, the constant guiding principle of his political career over the past 35 years is to assure permanent Israeli control over the West Bank. Sharon has been the single most important driving force in building illegal settlements in the West Bank. He orchestrated a disastrous war against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Lebanon in 1982. In the midst of sensitive Palestinian-Israeli negotiations just months before he became premier, Sharon publicly encouraged settlers to grab every available hilltop fearing former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak was about to quit the West Bank. These are not the actions of a man willing to end Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and withdraw its army and settlers to the 1967 border.

Neither Arafat in the short-term nor Sharon down the road will be willing accomplices in implementing Bush’s plan. The only real question is whether the Bush administration will stay engaged and take the necessary risks to implement a fair solution, or if it will revert to its first year form and disengage, thereby allowing Arafat and Sharon to kill any hope for peace and a better life for Israelis and Palestinians.

Glenn E. Robinson is an associate professor of International Graduate Studies. The above text may be used without permission but with proper attribution to the Palestine Center (Palestine Center). This Information Brief does not necessarily reflect the views of Palestine Center or The Jerusalem Fund. Robinson can be reached at grobinson@nps.navy.mil.

This information first appeared in Information Brief No. 95, 1 July 2002.