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The Clinton Years:
U.S. Policy Toward Israel and Palestine, Part One,
Overview: The key characteristic of U.S.-Israeli relations since 1967 has been steadfast U.S. political, diplomatic, military, and economic support for Israel. Regardless of how egregious Israels behavior, and despite the occasional, highly publicized U.S. wrist-slaps, Washington has been consistent in providing Israel economic and military aid and defending it in international venues. The Clinton administration has been no exception.
Clintons Middle East Team: When President Bill Clinton assumed office in January 1993, he signaled his position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through his high level administrative appointments. Martin Indyk, a former head of the pro-Israel think tank the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), was positioned as senior Middle East advisor on the National Security Council (later serving as two-term ambassador to Israel and assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs). Prior to serving at this post, he worked as an advisor to former Israeli Likud Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. Although Indyk was an Australian citizen, he was sworn in as a U.S. citizen in an act of peremptory executive privilege at President-elect Clintons express wishes. Dennis Ross, who served temporarily as interim director of WINEP after Indyk, was given the post of special Middle East coordinator. At the time of the Al-Aqsa intifada, some of the original players remainedmost notably, Ross. (The Washington Institute announced on January 16 that Ross will return to WINEP as counselor and distinguished fellow on March 1.)
Early Support for Israels Harsh Policies: In December 1992, Israel expelled 400 Palestinians for allegedly being Hamas supporters. Despite outrage from every quarter of the international community, Clinton refrained from criticizing Israel and worked closely with Tel Aviv to develop a face-saving device for then-Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. The U.S. solution, announced by the State Department, involved the return home of just 100 of the deportees in a timely fashion; half of the rest were to return in September, and the remainder in 1994. In March 1993, Rabin declared emergency measures, including the closure of the border between Israel and the Occupied Territories. This policy of closure has remained in effect since then, although in varying degrees of intensity, severely damaging the Palestinian economy and in other ways injuriously affecting Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Clinton, however, never condemned the closure. Six months after the emergency measures went into effect, on September 13, Clinton presided over the signing of the Declaration of Principles. Clinton thereafter acted as Israels handmaiden in the endless negotiations that followed, while simultaneously beguiling the Palestinian leadership with pledges of U.S. neutrality and evenhandedness as an honest broker.
Camp David: Nearing the end of his presidential tenure and concerned that history credit him with some genuine success, Clinton convened a summit in July 2000 at Camp David in the hopes of concluding a final Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. Yet, adhering to previous efforts to broker such a deal, the U.S. presented the Israeli agenda to the Palestinians as a fait accompli. When, for the first time, the Palestinians did not accede to the U.S.-fronted Israeli proposals, Clinton and his aides harshly blamed Arafat for the failure of the summit. Shortly thereafter, Clinton appeared on Israeli television in a strong show of support for the Jewish State, repeating his guarantees of military aid, an upgrading of the strategic relationship, and consideration of moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem.
Support of Israel During the Intifada: This ongoing demonstration of Washingtons partisanship, combined with former Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharons arrogant visit to the Haram al-Sharif on September 28, were the sparks that ignited a tinder box built upon seven empty years of negotiations and broken commitments. For the Palestinians, these were years of growing frustration, hopelessness, and despair at the worsening situation. Palestinians have faced tremendous unemployment, poverty, continued land confiscation, and house demolition. Due to the closure, most could no longer access employment, education, medical care, and holy sites in Jerusalem. Israels response to the resulting intifada was swift, brutal, and lethal. Within three months, over 350 Palestinians were dead and more than 10,000 injured, many severely. Using tanks, helicopter gunships, assassinations, and starvation, Israel has laid siege to the Occupied Territories. While the rest of the world denounces Israels draconian measures, the United States maintains its unswerving support. At the outset of the violence, France and Germany both initiated an undeclared embargo on Israel of military equipment and materials. In stark contrast to French and German policies, U.S. arms deliveries to Israel increased. Amnon Barzilai reported in the October 3 issue of Haaretz on the largest purchase of military helicopters by the Israeli Air Force in a decade. The report cited an agreement with the U.S. to provide Israel with 35 Blackhawk military helicopters and spare parts É along with jet fuel, following the purchase, shortly before, of patrol aircraft and Apache attack helicopters. On November 14, Clinton asked Congress to grant $450 million in extra aid to Israel in addition to the astronomical amounts it already receives annually. For example, in fiscal year 1997, Israel received $3 billion from the foreign aid budget; $525 million from other U.S. budgets; and $2 billion in federal loan guarantees. Under the new request, the U.S. would give Israel $250 million to defray the cost of the Lebanon withdrawal, and $200 million to develop new weapons such as the Arrow anti-missile shield. The request also included a suggestion that Israels military aid next year include an extra $350 million. The U.S. Congress declined to approve Clintons request.
Support at Sharm el-Sheikh: Under the October 17 Sharm el-Sheikh agreement, the president provided cover for Israels desire to return to the status quo ante and revitalize the Oslo process, while also exerting heavy handed pressure on Arafat to stop the violence. Moreover, Clinton oversaw a secret agreement at Sharm el-Sheikh between Palestinian Preventive Security head Jibril Rajoub and Israels General Security Services head Avi Dichter for resumption of their cooperation in counter-terrorist activities. These included the re-arrest of Hamas and Islamic Jihad activists, disarming the Tanzim militias, joint operations to preempt the creation of terror cells, and other shared actions. (By the end of December, a special Israeli military unit had assassinated eight senior Fateh leaders.) Implementation of the deal would be overseen by CIA chief George Tenet and the CIA representative in Tel Aviv. It is worth recalling that a major aspect of the Oslo Accords involved the CIA training Palestinian policemen to become Israeli surrogatesinformants and enforcers of order in the West Bank and Gaza.
The U.S.-Israeli Partnership: It is the full partnership of the U.S. and Israel in the sham of Oslo that is responsible for the inevitable uprising of the Palestinians against the new, and more onerous, form of occupation that the so-called peace process has attempted to impose. The real purpose of the Oslo Accords was to provide the Palestinians limited autonomy. Their areas of control would be segregated into non-contiguous enclaves and would be surrounded by Israeli-controlled borders, with settlements and settlement roads punctuating and essentially violating the territories integrity. During the past seven years, land expropriations, bypass roads, and new settlements (three official and 42 unofficial) have mushroomed, while the demolition of Palestinian homes has risen dramatically to over 2,000. These developments have occurred amidst ever increasing U.S. economic and military support, and barely a word of objection from Washington.
Cheryl A. Rubenberg is Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida International University. The above text may be used without permission but with proper attribution to the author and to the Palestine Center. This Information Brief does not necessarily reflect the views of Palestine Center or The Jerusalem Fund. This information first appeared in Information Brief No. 61, 19 January 2001. |
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