|
“The Failure of the
Oslo Process,”
Background: The Al-Aqsa intifada has revealed the inherent flaws of the Israeli-Palestinian “peace process.” It has exposed its fraudulent nature and the bad faith in which negotiations have been conducted. Any pretense that a peace resulting from the Oslo Accords could still be in the offering is unreasonable.
The Emergence of the Oslo Accords: The Arab consensus prior to Oslo was that a resolution of the conflict must be based on the exchange of land for peace. The Palestinian leadership, for its part, would not accept a peace process outside the framework of international legality. However, Israel rejected any framework in which it acknowledged it was an occupier, and refused to make any commitment to withdraw and stop building settlements. The impasse was broken only when Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat stepped in and, contrary to his own instructions to his Washington representatives, agreed to negotiate with Israel without any conditions and in an open-ended process. The Oslo Accords were the result.
Oslo’s Effect on Palestinians: Dreams of reintegrating the Palestinian nation—comprised of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, in the diaspora, and in Israel—were shattered by the Oslo Accords. For the millions of Palestinians in the diaspora, the Oslo process meant that there would never be restitution or a right of return. For the Palestinians inside Israel, Oslo meant that they would have to accept their status as second-class citizens. As for the Palestinians inside the West Bank and Gaza, Oslo became an instrument to prolong and consolidate the Israeli occupation of Palestine by pseudo-diplomatic means. More Jewish settlements have been built since the start of the Oslo process in 1993 than in any other period. Palestinians watched as their land was expropriated for these settlements, as well as for bypass roads that connect the settlements to each other and to Israel proper. It was Oslo that provided a cover for these conquests. Only by terminating the Oslo “peace process” can the Palestinians’ hopes and dreams be restored.
What Oslo Means to Israel: The Israeli government views the Oslo Accords quite differently. Oslo is the single most important instrument for the realization of strategic Israeli and Zionist goals. Oslo is the first diplomatic arrangement that has permitted Israel to make tangible settlement gains with minimal reliance on force. Moreover, Oslo has allowed Israel to transfer the dirty work to its new subcontractor, the Palestinian Authority (PA).
The Collapse of Camp David II: Unlike previous agreements, which dealt solely with issues designated as interim subjects, Camp David II was to encompass the intractable issues deferred for “final status” negotiations. When Camp David collapsed, Palestinians applauded the fact that their leader, Arafat, had not capitulated. An acceptance of Barak and Clinton’s position would have been tantamount to a surrender. Arafat was obviously facing his moment of truth. It was one thing to talk about the size of land ceded to his authority and the extent of that authority during the interim phase; it was quite another to broach the intractable issues that had been deferred since 1993, and which somehow were thought to have been deferred indefinitely. When those issues were finally placed on the table, however, it became clear that in exchange for having accepted Israel on 78 percent of their former territory, the Palestinians would be allowed to have a borderless, non-sovereign, and fragmented Palestinian “state” in less than 90 percent of the remaining 22 percent of Palestine.
Structural Failure of Oslo: A quick glance at the Oslo Accords reveals that the failure at the Camp David summit was due largely to structural defects in the Declaration of Principles (DOP). There is almost no transition plan connecting the interim issues to the intractable final status issues. The project was undermined by a colossal imbalance of power between Israel and the Palestinians, by a steady and growing “Israelization” of U.S. Middle East policy, by a vigorous colonization drive by Israeli settlers, and by Arab disarray. The Oslo process demonstrated that the so-called peace partners were hopelessly divided over interpretations and their desired end results. For the United States and Israel, a Camp David agreement was the natural last step in a series of concessions extracted from Arafat. Clinton was banking on his penchant for creative diplomacy to produce one more agreement. This time, however, the method of deferring the substantive issues—an approach which had produced the earlier agreements—had run its course. Arafat spoiled the party and surprised his host by failing to sign off on a final surrender.
The Surge of the Intifada: After the Camp David talks collapsed, the editorials and opinion pieces in the Israeli press predicted that Arafat’s rebuff would not go unanswered. Israel has never had difficulty finding pretexts for its military actions—not in 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, or 1982, and not now. This time, former Israeli Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon made a triumphant entry to the Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem, surrounded by more than 1,000 armed police, to provoke the Palestinians. Israel’s newly trained sharpshooters, with orders to kill, went into action against Muslim worshipers the next day. The massacre of hundreds of Palestinians has continued for more than two months now. Meanwhile, the Clinton administration has used its United Nations vote to shield Israel from worldwide condemnation. Washington has supplied Israel with Cobra helicopter gunships—and other instruments of death—that are being used against Palestinian urban areas. On October 25, the U.S. Congress passed House Concurrent Resolution 426 which blames the victim for the violence in the area.
Arafat’s Strategy: Having traded the Palestinian people’s legitimacy for U.S. and Israeli legitimacy, Arafat has placed himself in a no-win situation. He is unable to deliver either to Israel and the United States, or to his own constituents. The Palestinian people were ready to scale down their aspirations, but not to surrender their fundamental rights. Should Arafat acquiesce to demands to suppress the intifada, he would undoubtedly risk losing his role as leader of the Palestinian people. Should he, on the other hand, lead the intifada, he would not only risk losing U.S. and Israeli support, scant as it may be these days, but he would also risk a greater punishment than what has already been inflicted on him, his institutions, and his people. What is his strategy then? The intifada and its leadership have denounced Oslo, and so did Arafat’s Fateh organization, but Arafat himself did not. His PA was, after all, created by Oslo. Consequently, the PA has no alternative strategy, except to use the unrest for the achievement of a better deal. Arafat’s approach is quite unlikely to yield an improvement over what has been attempted during the past seven years.
Key Recommendations:
Naseer Aruri a member of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Center. The above text, based on a presentation at Palestine Center’s November 17 conference titled, “Beyond the ‘Peace Process’: Toward a New Framework,” may be used without permission but with proper attribution to the author and to the Palestine Center. This information first appeared in Policy Brief No. 11, 7 December 2000. |
||