“Continuity and Change Arising from the Second Palestinian Uprising,”
by James Ron

Background:

In the last two months, Israeli forces have killed more than 250 Palestinians, wounded thousands more, and disrupted the lives of nearly three million people. Yet despite these painful costs, the second Palestinian intifada may be creating new opportunities for political progress. Although it may take years before an equitable peace treaty is finally reached, the current situation is likely to be remembered as a turning point in Israeli-Palestinian relations.

The Limits of Israel’s Control:

The second uprising’s significance resembles that of the first intifada (1987-1993). The earlier uprising forced Israelis to realize that their vision of a “Greater Israel” was unrealistic. Throughout the 1980s, groups such as the settler movement Gush Emunim (supported by successive governments) persuaded Israelis of all political persuasions that continued domination in Palestine was a viable long-term strategy. However, the Palestinians’ intense resistance during the uprising raised the costs of occupation, led to Israel’s recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and obliged Israel to sign the Oslo Accords. Most Israelis came to realize they could not directly rule all of Palestine indefinitely. Yet many remained convinced of their ability to maintain indirect control through retaining sovereignty over Palestinian East Jerusalem, preserving settlements, annexing key portions of the West Bank, and controlling Palestine’s borders, water supply, economy, internal transportation, and immigration policies. If the second uprising continues, it will force Israel to realize yet again the limits to its power.

Israel’s Domestic Political Scene:

The Greater Israel movement lost momentum due to the first intifada, but the 400,000 Jewish settlers can mobilize a powerful constituency in opposition to settlement withdrawals and other concessions. More broadly, Greater Israel mobilization, coupled with the basic tenets of Labor Zionism, has created a reservoir of anti-Palestinian sentiment. Labor and Likud draw on this when formulating policy and attracting voters, enormously complicating attempts to achieve peace. Israeli leaders commit political suicide if they make rapid and frequent concessions during negotiations.

If Israel is to take the steps necessary for peace, it must first undergo a traumatic internal upheaval in which the lingering power of the Greater Israel movement is put to rest. Although the conditions for such a conflict are still far from ripe, the second uprising has raised the costs of the Israeli occupation. If the uprising continues, it may eventually push Israel closer to its internal showdown. Whatever the immediate outcome, the second uprising has put an end to the Israeli hegemonic discourse of the 1990s, which assumed that Palestinian political ambitions could be successfully managed through piecemeal withdrawals and privileges for the Palestinian elite.

Possibilities for Decolonization:

Anti-Palestinian sentiment in Israel rose sharply in October, with media commentators and government officials suggesting that Palestinians had proved unworthy as “partners for peace.” Yet this will not necessarily translate into harsher long-term policies on the ground. The uprising may paradoxically promote Jewish pragmatism in light of persistent Palestinian resistance.

This observation flies in the face of conflict resolution approaches which suggest that peace can only materialize when warring groups come to accept and trust one another. Yet decolonization almost always occurs amidst great hostility, chauvinism, and suspicion. The British were disdainful of Indians, the French had no love for Algerians, Americans disliked Vietnamese, and Israelis resented Muslim Lebanese. Still, each of those powers withdrew its control apparatus and made important concessions once anti-colonial resistance raised the material, political, and public relations costs of occupation. Israel will dismantle settlements and withdraw from the Palestinian territories when the costs of continued occupation become unacceptable.

In recent weeks, a number of Israeli commentators have referred to the “difficulties” involved in defending the more “absurd” and “remote” settlements, including those in Hebron, Gush Katif, and Elon Moreh. A limited settlement evacuation in the near future possibly could occur, largely in response to the army’s difficulty in preventing attacks on isolated Jewish colonies. Once one or more settlements have been evacuated, the taboo against decolonization may be undermined, paving the way for further evacuations.

Debate over Israel’s Military Response:

Although Palestinians and much of the world believe Israel’s response has already been too harsh, powerful groups within Israel feel the army has displayed restraint. Until now, however, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and his ministers have refrained from adopting the most extreme contingency plans, such as an Israeli military invasion of enclaves under Palestinian control in the “Area A” zones. Such a move would be politically risky, as it would end the peace process entirely, cause significant casualties, and then leave Israel in control of rebellious, armed areas with no clear exit plan or political strategy. The international costs of such a move would be high, and domestic public opinion would be split.

Barak and the Israeli government realize that an escalation of military efforts will do little to end the uprising, and are likely to increase Palestinian mobilization and resistance. Important military figures who argued during the first intifada that there is no military solution to a popular rebellion are gradually beginning to do the same now.

Still, Israeli public opinion and domestic politics demand that Barak’s government “do something” to cause Palestinian pain. Whereas a reoccupation of Area A is unlikely, further escalation of helicopter attacks, assassination of Fatah leaders, and other similar methods are probable. However, many Jews situated to the left of the settlers do believe that negotiations of some sort must continue.

Palestine’s ‘Lebanonization’:

The extent to which Israeli commentators now speak of the West Bank and Gaza as “foreign” and “hostile” lands is remarkable. The Israeli discourse of the 1980s, which spoke of “control,” has shifted to the language of war and counterinsurgency. This will create considerable hardship for Palestinians in the short term. There is little doubt that the new discourse will produce more destructive Israeli measures against Palestinian enclaves. Once constructed as an object of counterinsurgency in 1968, Lebanon was repeatedly pounded by Israeli artillery, airplanes, and commandos, leading to massive loss of life and material destruction.

At the same time, Israel’s occupation of Lebanon was not routinized to the extent witnessed in the West Bank and Gaza, and Lebanon was never perceived by most Jewish Israelis as a “natural” extension of Israel. As a result, occupation forces could withdraw from Lebanon without triggering a crippling internal political crisis.

Palestine, on the other hand, was subjected to processes of far-reaching incorporation and “creeping annexation” during the 1970s and 1980s, enormously complicating any eventual Israeli withdrawal. One of the most significant outcomes of the first Palestinian uprising was its ability to blunt this process of ideological incorporation.

The second uprising has hastened the “externalization” of Palestine for Israelis. In the long term, this process may hold some promise. The more Palestine is viewed by Israelis as a “foreign” land, the greater are Palestine’s long term prospects for freedom. This reality is accompanied by the PA’s small, lightly armed force of potential insurgents rooted in their own population and land, situated only miles or yards from Jewish settlements for the first time since 1971. Since public opinion will prevent Israel from crushing Area A zones entirely, it may eventually be forced to engage in settlement dismantlement and withdrawal.

James Ron is an Assistant Professor of Sociology at Johns Hopkins University. The above text, based on a presentation at Palestine Center’s November 17 conference titled, “Beyond the ‘Peace Process’: Toward a New Framework,” may be used without permission but with proper attribution to the author and to Palestine Center. This Information Brief does not necessarily reflect the views of Palestine Center or The Jerusalem Fund.

This information first appeared in Information Brief No. 55, 30 November 2000.