“Barak‘s Inability to ‘Make a Historical Peace’,”
by Marwan Bishara

Introduction:

Sixteen months ago, much of the world celebrated the victory of Ehud Barak over the obstructionist Binyamin Netanyahu in Israel’s election for prime minister. Washington rejoiced and hoped the peace process would get back on track. Barak promised to make peace with all of Israel’s neighbors within a year, and he assured Israelis that, unlike his predecessor, he would respect Israel’s democratic process and institutions. Hailed as Israel’s most decorated soldier, Barak was portrayed as a visionary who would make a historical peace.

Now, as the Clinton administration and the U.S. press continue to praise Barak for courage and diplomacy, Israelis are seeing their prime minister in a more critical, even negative, light. His aides and friends are abandoning him, his ministers are criticizing him, most of his coalition partners have left his government, and his admirers in academia and the Israeli press now are speaking out against his governing style and policies.

The overconfidence that characterizes Barak’s political and personal behavior has detached the Israeli premier from reality. Barak believes that as long as his relations with Washington remain strong, and as long as his political and diplomatic moves are coordinated with the Clinton administration, he can still bring about an agreement with the Palestinians. If that doesn’t work, he can turn to Likud to establish a “national unity government” and blame Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat for the failure.

A Conservative Record:

Barak stormed into office with grandiose plans. He spoke confidently about achieving peace, security, and prosperity, but he stuttered when it came to implementing these ideas. In fact, Barak established a mostly right-wing coalition, picking up where Likud had left off in implementing the right’s agenda.

Barak has employed his good relations with the Clinton administration to avoid implementing signed agreements. He expanded the settlements, and he completed what Netanyahu could not even begin—the encirclement of Jerusalem with the construction of Jewish housing in Abu Ghnaim, called Har Homa in Hebrew.

Netanyahu had to sign the Wye River Memorandum in order to maintain his relationship with the White House. In contrast, Barak managed to keep excellent rapport with President Bill Clinton while blocking all movement toward further Israeli redeployment during and after the Sharm el-Sheikh summit meeting.

This refusal to support progress in negotiations was consistent with his political record. As interior minister in 1993, Barak refused to vote in favor of the Oslo agreement—abstaining instead—and convinced Aryeh Deri, then head of Shas, to follow suit. He later attacked Netanyahu for being weak on security arrangements.

The Military Influence:

Barak has shown that he prefers loyalty over expertise, secrecy over transparency, and military-like political operations over the slower process of making policy. He has ignored the Knesset and mistreated his coalition partners—including his most devoted ally, David Levy. Barak expects his allies, partners, and aides to behave like military subordinates dealing with their general.

Barak filled the prime minister’s office with military men, particularly those who had served in his unit. He prefers to surround himself with those who know how to take orders and execute them. He even appointed a war criminal—Amos Yaron, who assisted in the Sabra and Shatila massacre—as director of the foreign ministry. But a little over a year later, at least six of those comrades-turned-aides have left their general. Some have hung up his dirty laundry on their way out.

Even Arafat did not escape Barak’s arrogance—only Clinton did. Barak, like former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, considers his relationship with Clinton strategically crucial. But a strategy that does not take into account the political reality on the ground can only fail.

Coalition Turbulence:

As Barak finished his first year, his country’s conditions were worsening, and his coalition was falling apart. Seventy-seven percent of Israelis said their situation had not improved since Barak took office. Unemployment had increased and the economy had worsened. Meanwhile, the coalition, which was based on Barak’s decisive electoral victory, soon perished.

While the peace negotiations played a central role in the collapse of the coalition, there were other factors at work as well. Barak could have kept the Sephardic Shas party on board if it had not been for his disrespect and lack of consideration. Instead, Barak angered Shas, Israel’s third-largest party, and blamed its departure from the coalition on his ally and the head of the Meretz party, Yossi Sarid.

Now, Barak is setting out on a dangerous course that seems to be leading him closer to Likud’s right-wing Ariel Sharon, whom he recently praised and with whom he hopes to establish a national unity government once the peace process collapses and Arafat is blamed for it. Such a coalition is needed to save both leaders from the wrath of Binyamin Netanyahu, who in case of a political vacuum is destined to replace Sharon at the helm of Likud. Recent polls have given Netanyahu 47 percent versus 43 percent for Barak. But Barak has another strategy up his political sleeve: a new constitution and new elections.

“Civic Revolution”:

While the Israeli media were occupied recently with the dissolution of Barak’s staff, the prime minister surprised Israel with proposals for a new constitution—which, in spite of their resemblance to the country’s existing Basic Laws, were presented as a “civic revolution.” Barak hopes that a debate over a liberal constitution that permits—for example—civil marriages, will divide the right into religious or secular camps. He also anticipates that this constitution will attract the secular population. He is aiming especially to draw in the Russian immigrants and the secular members of the Shinui party, in addition to the many secularists in Likud itself. Barak expects both Meretz and Shinui, which are keeping their distance from him, to join his so-called civic revolution.

The Test of the Ballot Box:

Barak hopes to couple his civic plan with an agreement, preferably a final one, with the Palestinians, which would lead him to a sure electoral victory. Early elections are certain to be held, especially after the right has begun the process of dismantling the Knesset. If the chances for an agreement with the Palestinians remains distant, and if Sharon refuses to enter into a national unity government because of Barak’s “far-reaching” concessions in the talks with the Palestinians, then Barak would resort to the secular vs. religious card.

This is shortsighted and risky business, and Barak’s optimism is ill founded. He has no parliamentary majority that could impose a constitutional debate in the Knesset, and his strategy has already been revealed as a shallow ploy. His preference is to keep closer relations with Washington, even if that means adhering to Clinton’s compromise proposals on Jerusalem—not difficult since Arafat is destined to refuse them.

Barak’s Failure:

Barak has failed in his promises as prime minister. He proved that he does not have what it takes politically or personally to make a historical reconciliation with the Palestinians and the Arabs. His words on peace and democracy were emptied of their meaning when he refused to curtail the settlers and confront the right. He also squandered a peace agreement with Lebanon and Syria. Now, regardless of whether he attains an agreement with Arafat or not, his proposals on Jerusalem and the settlements will prove impossible to implement, and his red lines on the refugees and sovereignty short-lived. Real courage would involve telling Israelis what is at stake and what it will take to make peace with the Arabs. Barak should know that there is a limit to the use of power, his own and Israel’s. Washington, however, is signaling otherwise.

Marwan Bishara is a Palestinian author and journalist. The above text may be used without permission but with proper attribution to the author and to the Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine. This Information Brief does not necessarily reflect the views of the Palestine Center or The Jerusalem Fund.

This information first appeared in Information Brief No. 49, 20 September 2000.