“The Palestinian State: Building from the Grassroots,”
by Mustafa Barghouthi

Overview:

12 September 2000—On September 13, the Middle East will face the deadline for the completion of the interim phase of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Although over the weekend, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Central Council postponed the September 13 deadline for declaring a state, the importance of this date should not be underestimated.

Officials who have advocated postponing a unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state cite the recommendations of leaders in the international community, refer to the increased risk of confrontation with Israel, and highlight the fact that Israel has threatened to annex the land it controls in the Occupied Territories if the state is declared. But the postponement of the declaration also has a price. This delay may contain a risk to the credibility of the Palestinian Authority (PA). A declaration of statehood should not simply be used as a tactic to push the negotiations forward, especially since statehood is a paramount goal of the Palestinian people, and a significant part of a decades-long struggle. The desire for statehood is closely bound up with the Palestinian people’s struggle to rebuild their institutions and official and popular organizations, as well as the infrastructure of their cities, villages, and refugee camps.

Although the PLO Central Council postponed the declaration, steps still can—and must—be taken now to begin creating the state. The declaration of Palestinian statehood was initially scheduled for 4 May 1999—the original deadline for the conclusion of the interim stage—but was postponed as negotiations progressed. The interim phase was extended by the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, signed on 4 September 1999, in the hope that Israeli elections would help settle what six years of post-Oslo negotiations had not resolved. Instead, as a result of the elections, the crisis became more complicated, mostly because of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s “red lines” and his apparent underestimation of the Palestinians’ commitment to restoring their full rights. The danger for the Palestinian people is that while these delays occur, Israel continues to expropriate Palestinian land, expand settlements, confiscate the ID cards of Jerusalem’s Palestinians, build bypass roads, demolish Palestinian homes, and in other ways alter the reality of the Occupied Territories’ landscape.

Alternative Options:

The Palestinians have options outside the Oslo negotiations, including, at this juncture, a calculated intensification of attempts to build their state. They should no longer be held hostage to the interim agreements as the only reference point for peace. Negotiations are a strategy for achieving human rights and a just peace, not an end in themselves.

The Palestinian people have an opportunity to break from the confines of the Oslo Accords and let their state develop “on the ground,” or from the ground up. The international community should be able to understand this widely felt need, especially since Israel has repeatedly postponed troop redeployments that it has agreed to and in other ways violated the Oslo process. Starting on September 14, the international community—including Israel—should be able to witness Palestinians laying down the building blocks of an independent Palestinian state by passing laws, constructing roads, holding new elections, establishing a constitution, putting up new homes, and in other ways forging their state. This peaceful process will require the Palestinian leadership and political forces, along with their supporters and opponents, to direct their attention to the domestic front. The Palestinian public also will need to be involved in expanding the role of grassroots organizations.

The Importance of the State:

Moving toward creating a state would fulfill the Palestinians’ aspiration for independence, dignity, and freedom from a legacy of injustice under prolonged Israeli military occupation. The Palestinian people want to establish a democratic homeland, one governed by justice and the rule of law. Such a state would be the embodiment of the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination, a right that most peoples of the world take for granted. The Palestinians hope to create a model of governance different from what has been predominant in the region, and to demonstrate that the Palestinian people can struggle with honor, live in dignity, and establish a democratic system.

The formation of a state is crucial in maintaining progress toward Israeli-Palestinian peace. The Palestinians already have compromised in accepting a proposed state that would consist only of the areas occupied by Israel in 1967, including East Jerusalem, even though this would constitute no more than 22 percent of Mandate Palestine. They have consented to this compromise despite the injustice and inequity it entails, particularly for those who fled or were expelled from their homes and land during the establishment of Israel. If the formation of a Palestinian state is further delayed, the physical base for a two-state compromise could vanish.

Statehood from the Ground Up: Despite the fact that statehood will not be declared on September 13, the Palestinians—including the PLO’s Central Council—must no longer be bound by the interim agreement’s obligations and restrictions.

There are obvious physical limitations on such a state as long as Israel maintains—in reality—complete military control over nearly 80 percent of the West Bank. This creates clear difficulties in building a contiguous, cohesive state. Still, the state must be institutionalized without delay, and the foundations that already exist must be expanded upon.

The establishment of statehood will require the immediate execution of policies that assert independence from the interim limitations. This process would include the implementation of the Palestinian Basic Law—an interim constitution as yet unsigned by Arafat—as well as the termination of all restrictions on Palestinian legislation. It also would require elections for a parliament and for the Palestinian National Council (PNC). A date would need to be established for the election of local village and municipal councils. The last elections for these 450 council members were held in 1976. The PLO also will need to initiate talks with neighboring Arab states on the demarcation of borders. The declaration of statehood would involve implementing Palestinian regulations and curricula, as well as reviewing the taxation system and the prohibitions and complications the Oslo Accords entail.

This process of building the state from the ground up should include the deletion of the Israeli identity number from the Palestinian passport. It would mean granting thousands of building permits to Palestinians in all areas of the Occupied Territories, whether inside the Palestinian—or the Israeli—controlled areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This process also would involve Palestinian ministries setting up offices in Jerusalem.

The Palestinian people will need to be involved as the primary actors in this process of nation-building. The most direct way to encourage their participation is by addressing domestic problems, beginning with the implementation of civil service laws and strengthening the rule of law. Addressing inequities and injustices in the legal and political systems is part of the process of state-building. If political and grassroots leaders are seen to be actively involved in building the state—a tangible state, not one constructed only on the diplomatic level—then the public will be encouraged to commit itself to the task. The reality of the state would become more visible as it gets more and more embodied in institutions and practices.

The struggle for statehood is daunting. However, today the Palestinians have more tools and capabilities—immeasurably more—and a broader international understanding than what was available to the isolated Palestinian populace before the beginning of the Oslo process.

Mustafa Barghouthi is the director of the Health, Development, Information, and Policy Institute in Ramallah. He was a member of the Palestinian negotiating team to the peace talks and was on the steering committee to the multilaterals. The above text may be used without permission but with proper attribution to the author and to the Palestine Center. This Information Brief does not necessarily reflect the views of Palestine Center or The Jerusalem Fund.

This information first appeared in Information Brief No. 48, 12 September 2000.