Those six agreements, produced by summits hailed as successes, proved in fact to be utter failures for the Palestinian people. The end result: more settlements, more bypass roads, more land confiscation, more house demolitions, more pent-up violence, further economic decline, increased unemployment, and less stability in the West Bank and Gaza.

In order for a new Camp David agreement to be successful, it must adhere to the principles of international legality—and therefore the concerns of the entire Palestinian population (inside and outside of the Occupied Territories)—so that it can be realistically implemented and can have lasting power. Otherwise, what we will have in the end is only the ultimate temporary agreement.

An Internationally Legal Agreement:

In order for a final solution to endure, it must be compatible both in spirit and letter with international law. Yet Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s “red lines” are in direct violation of international law. “No” to the return to the 1967 borders means no to United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 242. “No” to the return of Palestinian refugees means no to UN General Assembly Resolution 194. “No” to withdrawal from East Jerusalem and allowing any Palestinian sovereignty over it means no to UNSCR 242 and UN General Assembly Resolution 181. Finally, “no” to the dismantling of Jewish settlements built on the Occupied Territories means no to UNSCR 242 and the 4th Geneva Convention. The Palestinian red lines reflect the opposite. They call for the full application of the international resolutions that have been long ignored by Israel, particularly since Washington removed the peace process from its international framework.

However, leaks recently reported by the Israeli press are already showing that contradictions could coexist in American-sponsored Middle East diplomacy. As Israeli Justice Minister Yossi Beilin assured us recently, the summit will produce an agreement that will “respect the red lines” of both parties. In other words, much will be left for later interpretations by the parties. A major chunk of the work focuses on the wording of an agreement that gives in on the substance in the interest of one party—Israel—in favor of form for the other party—the Palestinians. This starts by redrawing the red lines with different shades, which will then allow both leaders to sell the agreement to their respective publics as a victory.

Let’s take the thorniest issues, refugees and Jerusalem, as they appear in the formulation of a hypothetical agreement based on Israeli leaks, media reports, and official declarations of the parties. Instead of sharing Jerusalem by withdrawing from occupied East Jerusalem in accordance with UNSCR 242, Israel proposes enlarging the city’s boundaries to include surrounding villages, and then share it with the Palestinians who will in turn make the newly annexed Arab “neighborhoods” their capital, calling it East Jerusalem.

The same tactic applies for the refugee question. Reportedly, Israel proposed to make a “substantial contribution” to an international fund that will oversee compensation but will only allow return of a limited number of refugees under the title of “family reunification.” Israel had already done this in the 1950s, and now, family reunification will include no more than tens of thousands out of the 3.6 million officially registered refugees.

However, will this formulation stand the test of international legitimacy? In order for the Palestinians to deem this “the end” of the conflict—presumably a must-phrase for Barak—an agreement will have to go beyond the territories occupied in the 1967 war, considering that the West Bank and Gaza inhabitants comprise only a third of the Palestinian people. An agreement must address the roots of the conflict, especially for the refugees of the 1948 war. Otherwise, these 3.6 million refugees will break away from PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat’s authority and establish an alternative organization that will demand the applicability of international legality. Such an organization will find sufficient support in many Arab circles, rendering any “final” agreement very temporary.

An Applicable Agreement:

International legitimacy and “relative justice” aside, the applicability of the resulting agreement, temporary or final, will be the most excruciating task ahead. Arafat, in particular, will find it impossible to sell an agreement that falls short on the principle of the “right of return.” His power base, the over-populated and miserable Gaza Strip—85 percent of whom are refugees—can distinguish between a red line and a white flag. For them, Israel’s refusal to take moral and legal responsibility for the refugees will be a non-starter in terms of implementation of a “final” agreement.

Moreover, an agreement that doesn't clearly contain full legal separation, including the recognition of Palestinian sovereignty, will prove an impracticable if not unrealizable task. Such a division would need to legally separate Palestinians from Jews in Jerusalem, the Occupied Territories, and Israel. Yet Israel demands mere “physical separation” from the Palestinians. But in the absence of a clear legal formulation in an agreement, Israel will end up militarily encircling Palestine from all its sides (including at the Jordan River, another Israeli red line), and will strengthen the apartheid system already in place. The resulting continued economic deterioration among the Palestinians will translate into escalating social problems in Israel-Palestine.

If the legal clauses are not completely clear, Arafat will have to confront a skeptical population that have little to gain from such an agreement and little to lose by opposing it, money notwithstanding. In spite of some three billion dollars of international aid, the last six agreements have led to a deteriorating standard of living and to a 20 percent lower GDP for Palestinians than before the negotiations began. Yet Israel, thanks to the Oslo process, has witnessed one of its most prosperous periods.

A Lasting Agreement:

Nevertheless, Barak demands Washington’s help to extract more Palestinian compromises in order for the agreement to pass an Israeli referendum, which he promised last year. For the Palestinians, a referendum on an agreement that defines their future homeland and turns the page on their disheartening past is far more urgent than an Israeli referendum about undoing an illegal occupation. A Palestinian referendum, including the accessible 3.6 million registered refugees, is thus necessary to ratify any “final” agreement signed in Washington.

In comparison with Israel, Palestinian public opinion reflects a national yearning for independence and self-determination and for freedom from occupation in the spirit and logic of international legitimacy. An agreement that takes into consideration the Palestinians’ rights corresponds to international legality, and is therefore possible to implement. It is by far more reliable than an agreement that is based on a temporary (im)balance of power and which is conditional on the approval of a colonial power.

The PLO has already made its “historical compromise” when it recognized Israel comprising over three-quarters of historic Palestine at the opening of the Oslo process. Any further compromise on the core and principle of the remaining issues will be met with scorn and disapproval by the Palestinians and will lead to failure. Only a morally sound agreement that upholds international legality will facilitate a political resolution of the conflict and ultimately prove successful.

Marwan Bishara is a Palestinian author and journalist. The above text may be used without permission but with proper attribution to the author and to the Palestine Center. This Policy Brief does not necessarily reflect the views of the Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine or The Jerusalem Fund.

This information first appeared in Information Brief No. 39, 18 July 2000.