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“Camp David II:
Conditions for Successful Negotiations,”
Background: 7 July 2000—Key issues such as the status of Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, and Israeli settlements remain unresolved seven years after Oslo negotiations began. What many in the international community hoped would be an historic opportunity to reconcile a century-old conflict has degenerated into real estate bickering and political foot-dragging, while Israel’s search for a secure peace has proven to be an exercise in humiliation for the Palestinian people. Israel’s repeated refusals to follow through on agreements and Washington’s exclusive mediation role eclipsed what many considered the necessary international and regional “spirit” of the 1991 Madrid Conference, which was based on a land-for-peace equation. As the negotiations enter their most crucial phase, they are deadlocked because of Israel’s failure to carry through on its commitments to the Oslo process—such as previously agreed to military redeployments—and because of its obstruction to meaningful discussion of the remaining “final status” issues. These issues, it now insists, can only be resolved immediately, and all at once, in the context of a “framework” agreement that puts an official end to Palestinian claims based on United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 242. This resolution calls for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the territories occupied during the 1967 war, as well as a “just settlement of the refugee problem.”
The Trilateral Summit: President Clinton, who has been disturbed by the escalation of tensions between the two parties in an election year, will attempt to put an end to the strain by summoning Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat for an open-ended summit. Clinton views this as a unique opportunity that must be seized. Washington sees no better alternative to Barak on the Israeli political horizon. A highly decorated general who commands the army’s support, Barak is viewed as more forthcoming than his predecessor, Binyamin Netanyahu, on the question of surrendering land and recognition of a demilitarized “Palestinian state.” From Washington’s point of view, Barak is a “moderate” and is ready to make an historical deal. The Israelis are pleased to see Washington respond quickly to their request for an early summit. Barak sees a summit as urgent because he believes his government cannot advance in the negotiations without a clear idea of the final result. The Palestinians, who have no objections to the idea in principle, are worried that the lack of solid preparation and the absence of goodwill on the part of Israel will render the summit unsuccessful. They are discouraged by Barak’s continued rejection of the applicability of UNSCR 242 on the entire West Bank and Gaza, including occupied East Jerusalem. Meanwhile, the Barak government continues to expand settlements even in the most populated Palestinian areas, such as the Gaza strip, and maintains its rejection of the right of return for the Palestinian refugees. In other words, Barak’s “generosity” on the land issues is offset by his exigency on the central issues of the final status negotiations. The Underlining Political Complexities: From a diplomatic viewpoint, some argue that now is an ideal time for negotiations to push forward. President Clinton wants a “splash” before leaving office; Barak needs to show that he can make peace with the Palestinians according to the same calendar that led to Israel’s withdrawal from south Lebanon; and Arafat plans on attending the United Nations’ 2000 session as head of state. Politically, however, the wisdom of this rush to the summit is questionable. In order for the summit to succeed, negotiators must lower expectations and return to the basics of the “peace process.” Washington must underline the violations of the Oslo agreements and suggest ways to amend them. With all its shortcomings, the Oslo process does have a logic, which divides the resolution of the conflict into two separate calendars. The first—an interim phase—is meant to resolve the issues of the Occupied Territories with the exception of those areas within the settlements, the Israeli military bases, and Jerusalem. According to conservative estimates, this comes to 85-90 percent of the West Bank and Gaza. The final status issues are attached to the second calendar, and include Jerusalem, the refugees, settlements, and eventually the creation of a Palestinian state. Yet as Israel has withdrawn from only 17.2 percent of the West Bank in violation of the Oslo process, Barak’s astute move to call for an early summit is meant to circumvent the Oslo process by making any further redeployment conditional on concluding a deal on the final status issues. This, he hopes, will allow him to sell further redeployment and Israeli recognition of a Palestinian mini-state in return for the Palestinians abandoning claims to Jerusalem, the right of return for refugees, and sovereignty. Palestinian Reservations: The Palestinian negotiators are skeptical of Clinton’s rush and are suspicious of Barak’s plan. They claim that Barak has made little attempt to resolve outstanding differences, and has made no effort to implement already signed agreements. If the Barak government is not acting in bad faith, the Palestinians ask, why didn’t he implement the Wye River Agreement, signed by his predecessor on 23 October 1998, and release Palestinian prisoners, implement the third redeployment, and open the safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank? Granted, a one-hundred-year conflict won’t come to an end in one hundred hours, yet a framework agreement that addresses the rights of refugees, the full applicability of UNSCR 242, and the Palestinians’ right for self-determination would lead to a more reliable peace. Only then can Israeli security and other concerns be discussed meaningfully. Otherwise, the summit will result in the PLO’s worst fear—that they will be cornered into a deal that the Palestinian populace will not accept. Washington, which has expressed its understanding regarding Barak’s fragile coalition of right-wing parties, must also show a profound understanding and sensitivity regarding the Palestinian reality. Arafat’s own stronghold—the overpopulated Gaza strip—is comprised of mostly refugees (85 percent), who, along with three million other refugees, are waiting for their exile to end. Moreover, Arafat’s Arab and Muslim backers have warned him against making any compromises on Jerusalem. Lowered Expectations: Israel and the Palestinians might be able to utilize the summit to facilitate serious negotiations on the basis of UNSCR 242 and other relevant resolutions. However, negotiators should have no ambitious agendas or grand designs. Barak is unwilling to confront his radical coalition partners by going directly to the Israeli public with a peace package which takes comprehensive Palestinian rights into consideration, and Arafat is incapable of selling Israel’s ultimatums to his public. If the summit fails, Arafat will likely declare a sovereign state over the entire West Bank and Gaza—including East Jerusalem—on September 13, as the PLO’s Central Committee reasserted this week. Such a declaration of statehood will not be merely symbolic, but factual, and will probably lead to violent escalation within an already tense situation. Israel will presumably punish the Palestinians by annexing all the territories it deems valuable. Considering the entire Palestinian population lives at a maximum distance of six miles from Israeli-controlled territories—which include 380,000 settlers—then the region could face a communal colonial war. For the Palestinians, the last seven years have been economically, physically, and psychologically difficult. They now face higher poverty rates, greater unemployment, and decreased access to education and health care than before the negotiations began. The Palestinians are under no delusion that a seventh agreement can easily avoid repeating the shabby and security-ridden agreements of the past. While climbing the summit, Washington needs to insure there is a safe way down.
Marwan Bishara is a Palestinian author and journalist. The above text may be used without permission but with proper attribution to the author and to the Palestine Center. This Policy Brief does not necessarily reflect the views of the Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine or The Jerusalem Fund. This information first appeared in Information Brief No. 37, 7 July 2000. |
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