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“June 1: Assad and
the Syrian-Israeli Negotiations: Continued Stalemate,”
Background: 1 June 2000—When the White House announced that President Bill Clinton would meet Syrian President Hafez al-Assad in Geneva on 26 March 2000, most observers expected Israel and Syria to resume negotiations and move rapidly toward a formal peace treaty. Most expected Clinton to transmit to Assad an Israeli commitment to withdraw from the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights to the 4 June 1967 lines, a long-standing Syrian demand. Clinton, they thought, would not have phoned Assad on March 9 to say that he had “great news” if the news had been less substantial. Instead, the talks broke down immediately, and there has been no evidence of progress since. Indeed, Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon on May 24, without first securing an agreement with Syria (to avoid Hezbollah attacks on retreating Israeli troops), has removed one incentive for Israel to return to the negotiating table.
High Hopes: Assad had expected a breakthrough in the deadlock. In addition to Clinton’s telephone call, his optimism was based on a signal from Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak that he was willing to talk specifically about borders. Indeed, Barak told his cabinet in a closed door meeting in late February that Rabin had given guarantees that Israel would fully withdraw from the Golan in exchange for security commitments by Syria. Referring to this statement, Barak said he would not “erase the past” (The New York Times, 27 February 2000), hinting that he, too, would accede to Syria’s demand if Israel’s security needs were met. Barak himself had stressed repeatedly that he would honor the negotiation’s historical record, although he had never made it clear publicly how the Israeli government perceived that record and was vague about his own plans. Israeli television and radio reporters treated his words as a revelation. According to Israel’s Channel 2 News, “it was the first time that an Israeli prime minister has ever admitted” Israel’s conditional agreement to a complete withdrawal. According to Gadi Baltiansky, Barak’s spokesman, Barak told his ministers that negotiations conducted by his immediate predecessors all presumed withdrawal from the Golan in relation to the 4 June 1967 line. Barak appeared to confirm what Syria had long maintained—that Rabin had left a “deposit” with the U.S., a promise to withdraw fully if Syria acceded to Israel’s demands on security. The Israeli Proposal: The proposal that Barak conveyed through Clinton, however, was significantly less: Israel would withdraw from most of the Golan, retain the northeastern shore of Lake Tiberias, and take full control of its waters, along with those from all the streams (originating in Syria) that flow into it. This proposal was a step back from Barak’s earlier stance. It was so anticlimactic that Clinton telephoned Barak immediately before meeting with Assad to nudge the Israeli prime minister to improve his tough terms. But Barak dug in his heels. What accounts for his change of heart? At the domestic level, Barak was under political fire from the hard-liners within his coalition government who reject a deal with Syria. Accordingly, he tried, but failed, to get Assad to engage in some form of public diplomacy so as to assure the Israeli public that Syria was serious about peace, a move that might enable him to make a deal. Over and above that, Barak predicted that Assad would take the offer at the eleventh hour. His assumption was based in part on Syria’s own internal difficulties (a shrinking economy, high unemployment), and in part because Assad is reportedly eager for his son Bashar, whom he is said to be grooming for the succession, to lead a Syria that is free of external conflict. The View from Washington: Washington concurred with Barak’s assessment. From Washington’s perspective, Syria’s bargaining position was weakened by the demise of its former patron, the Soviet Union, by the fragmentation of the Arab anti-Israel camp, and, at the domestic level, by the exhaustion of Syria’s centralized economy. In view of the imbalance of power-Syria’s economic and military inferiority vis-á-vis Israel-Clinton tried to persuade Assad that Damascus had little choice but to accept Israel’s terms. Clinton grossly underestimated the importance that Assad attaches to the recovery of Syria’s occupied territory. The View from Damascus: Assad is fully aware that he has several pressing domestic matters to attend to, such as promoting Bashar (without alienating his longtime aides) and liberalizing the economy (without giving the private sector inordinate political power). But, for the Syrian leader, the recovery of the Golan Heights is the foremost issue on his political agenda. Indeed, the containment of Israel within its pre-1967 boundaries has been the raison d’étre of the Assad regime and the linchpin of Assad’s strategic calculations. But, as most of Israel’s Arab neighbors embarked, one-by-one, on separate deals with the Jewish state, Assad has had to trim his objectives from the liberation of all occupied territories to recovering the Golan and ensuring the withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon. For Assad, a total Israeli withdrawal from the Golan is a matter of principle. It was on this basis—the land-for-peace equation—that Syria (and Israel) accepted the American invitation to the Madrid conference in 1991. This equation, embodied in UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, provides the foundation on which the negotiations stand. Any deviation from its basic tenets by either side may cause the entire peace process to collapse. By the terms of resolutions 242 and 338, Israel is to withdraw its armed forces from Arab territories it seized by force during the June 1967 war in exchange for Arab recognition of Israel. The controversy over Israel’s obligation to withdraw from “all” or “some” territories is solved by the key UN principle of the “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war,” emphasized in the preamble of Resolution 242. In light of this, Assad feels that the concessions he made, especially during the Syria Israel talks at Shepherdstown in January, fulfill his end of the deal. At that meeting, Assad endorsed the principles of normalizing relations with Israel, sharing water, and establishing a verifiable security regime. In return, Assad expects Barak to deliver on his end of the deal, namely the land component of the land-for-peace equation. Only then would Syria’s no-nonsense leader permit Syrians to fraternize with Israelis. Assad’s Bottom Line: As the last in a long line of Arab nationalist leaders, Assad cannot make any territorial concessions. This is in keeping with the stand he has consistently taken since the early 1970s. In the balance weighs not only Syrian honor, a concept that Washington and Tel Aviv have only recently come to acknowledge, albeit belatedly, but also the legitimacy of the Assad regime itself. If Assad is to endorse a peace treaty with Israel, he needs an Israeli commitment to withdraw fully from the Golan Heights. Failing that, Assad prefers to go down in history as the leader who did not make peace with Israel rather than as the leader who ceded parts of Syria to Israel. This is not to say that Israel should wait for Assad’s successor to secure a better deal. Assad is the only political figure in Syria powerful enough to make peace with Israel. His successor, whomever he may be, will have to consolidate his power first before he can entertain the notion of making peace with Israel. Given the rough nature of Syrian politics, this is not likely to happen soon. Continued Stalemate: In these circumstances, Assad’s rejection of Barak’s proposal in the first few minutes of his meeting with Clinton is hardly surprising. Washington should not expect Assad to accept anything less than that to which Syria is entitled under UN resolutions. To this end, Washington must stop deferring to Israeli whims and start exercising its role as an “honest broker” in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Failing that, Israel will continue to dance around the issues and waste what surely is an historic opportunity. Murhaf Jouejati, a Syrian foreign policy analyst, is currently a scholar-in-residence at the Middle East Institute. The above text may be used without permission but with proper attribution to the author and to the Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine. This brief does not necessarily reflect the views of Palestine Center or The Jerusalem Fund. This information first appeared in Information Brief No. 34, 1 June 2000. |
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