“What’s Gone Awry, Mr. Barak?”
by Roni Ben Efrat

Background:

29 February 2000—Only two months ago, it appeared that the Middle East would politely rearrange itself according to the plans of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. Syria would sign a treaty of peace with Israel, whose army, in turn, would pull out of Lebanon in a calm and dignified manner—not looking as though a guerrilla group had thrashed it.

The Palestinians, having no choice, would accept Israel’s dictates, paying the price for their political weakness. The spoils reaped from these agreements would open a glorious future. Israel would become the center of a new Middle East, and the Arabs would become the periphery. From the moment the treaties were signed, the future development of any Arab state would depend on the degree to which it normalized relations with Israel.

Think Again:

Things have not quite worked out that way so far. A heavy fog has settled over the Middle East. In mid-January, the Syrians left the Shepherdstown talks with Israel without setting a date for their resumption. The Lebanese situation is on the brink of going out of control. In Israel, voices arise from both extremes of the political spectrum, calling for immediate, unilateral withdrawal and/or for massive air strikes on civilian targets in Lebanon.

As for the Palestinians, on February 3 they broke off their talks with Israel, saying they could no longer see any difference between Barak and former Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. Six months ago, both Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Yasser Arafat gave Barak a generous portion of credit; he appears to have squandered it in large doses of arrogance.

Barak’s Strategy:

Upon being elected, Barak set himself the goal of signing treaties with Syria and the Palestinians during his first year. There was a necessity in linking the two. His aim is to bring down the barriers between Israel and the Arab world. Yet Arafat, he knows, is too weak to get the Arab states to open their doors to Israel. Nor does Barak plan to make the PA chief any stronger. He intends to give him very little territory—certainly not enough to raise his prestige among Arabs elsewhere.

The key, then, lies with Syria. If Barak can first bring Assad to his knees, the whole picture changes. First, he will have succeeded in closing the circle of peace with all nations bordering Israel—and without the help of Arafat. Secondly, the great blow to Palestinian pride will be swallowed up in a pan-Arab settlement including sovereign states such as Syria, Jordan, and Egypt.

What has gone wrong with Barak’s plans? The main factor is this: Syria’s Assad has not responded to Israeli pressure in the expected manner. Barak offered him a generous variation on the Oslo Accords: he would get back virtually all of the Golan Heights, but laced with conditions of surrender that Assad, so far, is unwilling to accept.

Arafat’s Dilemma:

Arafat has become a hostage to the proposed treaty with Syria, and he knows it. That is what lies behind his explosive walkout at the ill-fated meeting with Barak on 3 February 2000 at the Erez checkpoint leading into Gaza.

A month earlier, at a meeting with the Israeli prime minister in Ramallah, Arafat faced a difficult choice. As part of the series of Israeli troop redeployments agreed upon in the Wye River Memorandum (signed on 23 October 1998 by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization), Barak offered Arafat five percent of the West Bank—but in the form of largely unsettled wasteland.

Having refused these lands for weeks, Arafat did a turnabout by accepting them. Palestinian sources claim that Barak made a promise: in the next redeployment, the PA would be compensated, gaining full control in one of three areas bordering Jerusalem: Abu Dis, al-Azariyah, or al-Ram.

Barak’s About-face:

After the talks with Syria failed, however, Barak changed the tune. This was in keeping with the logic stated above: Until he can get a treaty with Syria, he sees no point in advancing on the Palestinian track. At the Erez meeting on February 3, claim Palestinian sources, the Israeli prime minister disregarded his promise of the previous month. Israeli public opinion, he said, still was not ready for a withdrawal near the borders of Jerusalem. He also insisted that the Palestinians agree to cancel the third redeployment, which was supposed to precede negotiation of the final status agreement; instead, said Barak, the redeployment ought to be incorporated into that agreement.

Arafat burst out in anger. He refused to accept the maps of the next redeployment (from six percent of the West Bank). The meeting ended without a joint press conference, and the Palestinians cancelled further official talks.

Unlike Assad, Arafat owes his position as PA chief to Israel and the United States. Despite the pose of righteous indignation, he has little room to maneuver. So, for example, people in the PA say that the decision to declare a Palestinian state on 13 September 2000 is final. But over what territory will they declare it? Over 40 percent of the West Bank? When even most of that is still “Area B”—under Israeli “security” control?

Grassroots Resistance:

Israel went to Madrid and Oslo to reap the fruits of its longstanding military superiority over the Arab world. Seeking to make the latter kowtow to it, Israel behaves with dangerous obduracy. Even if the Arab rulers agree to accept Israel’s dictates, there is no guarantee that the Arab people will follow suit. These people see Israel and the United States as a single foe. America’s continuing aggression toward Iraq, as well as Israel’s abuse of the Palestinians during the negotiations, do not pass without notice.

Only recently we have witnessed two significant popular reactions: