Looking for the Good Life:

The Golan has a particular place in the popular Israeli imagination. Israelis view the Golan settlers less like the “cowboys” waging land wars in the West Bank than as patriotic Israelis doing their part to assure Israeli security while searching for the good life. As Israel Harel, a prominent West Bank settler leader observed with some envy, Golan settlers, “went with the goodwill of all Israelis.”

Golan settlers—like those in Merom Golan, the first outpost established after June 1967—traditionally have been drawn from the ranks of Israel’s secular-left Zionists, rather than from the messianic romantics of Gush Emunim, who spearheaded settlement-building in the West Bank. Golan settlements, while certainly reflecting the Zionist imperative to settle the land, are predicated more on considerations of security and strategy than on divine right.

All along, there has been the sense that Israeli settlements in the Golan might be used as a card to be played in eventual negotiations with Syria. “Israeli history did not begin on the basalt rocks of the Golan,” explained former Labor minister Moshe Shahal in December 1993. “We did not conquer the Golan in order to annex it. We have all known that the Golan Heights was destined to become a strategic asset in the pursuit of peace.”

That is not to say that Israelis have not been drawn to the region by its historical Jewish associations. There is hardly a Jewish citizen who has not visited the remnants of the ancient Jewish fortress at Gamla where a battle was waged against the Romans. But for most Israelis, the Golan’s terrain and ecology, its open spaces and wonderful scenery, are what animate interest.

Builders seeking buyers for new homes along the plateau encourage the perception of the Golan as an environmental paradise. The builder of 200 cottages in the settlements of Bene Yehuda, Gamla, Had Nes, and Kidmat Zvi described them earlier this year as “real estate with a quality of life like Switzerland.” From the ski slopes at Jebel al-Sheikh (Mt. Hermon) to the hot springs and ruins at al-Hammah, where Israeli companies have invested millions of dollars, Israelis take pleasure in visiting the area.

Annexation:

On 14 December 1981, the Israeli Knesset passed the Golan Law annexing the area to Israel. In 1992, when the election of Yitzhak Rabin as prime minister raised the prospect of an agreement with Syria and cancellation of the Golan Law, Golan settlers sponsored a nationwide campaign under the slogan, “The People Are With the Golan.”

Rabin later committed to holding a national referendum on any agreement reached with Syria. But he, like current prime minister Ehud Barak, opposed efforts to require a super-majority (of 60 percent) in the Knesset to repeal the Golan Law—a position championed by the parliamentary faction most closely associated with the Golan settlers, the Third Way party.

In any case, on 26 January 1999, during the last months of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s government, the Knesset approved legislation requiring that any withdrawal from “sovereign Israeli territory” must win the approval of a simple majority of the Knesset. If the current Knesset approves, the law will also require a public referendum to ratify any withdrawal. Netanyahu’s commitment not to leave the Golan was called into question when he described the area in a 21 March 1999 letter to settlers only as a “strategic and security asset to the state of Israel.”

This statement did little to assuage doubts about his intention—doubts sparked by the publication of details of “Operation Mango,” a surreptitious government effort begun by Rabin and continued under Netanyahu to quantify Israel’s civilian investments in the Golan. According to the Israeli newspaper Yediot Aharanot (1 January 1999), the survey conducted at 29 of 33 settlements (but excluding the largest, Katzrin, home to 7,500 residents) identified $2.5 billion in civilian assets.

Barak’s Position:

Barak’s election, and the resumption of talks in late December, have only increased settler concerns. Notwithstanding recent media reports to the contrary, Barak’s adaptation of Rabin’s formula, declaring that “the depth of withdrawal will match the extent of peace and the quality of security arrangements,” is understood by Israelis to imply a readiness to evacuate all settlements.

To the settlers’ dismay, Barak’s promise to withdraw from southern Lebanon by June 2000 has also underscored the interdependence of Israel’s unpopular and bloody occupation there with the occupation of the Golan. “The price of holding [the Golan settlement of Katzrin],” noted an unidentified member of Netanyahu’s cabinet in February 1999, “is probably 30 to 40 dead [Israeli] soldiers a year in Lebanon.” Barak’s position on southern Lebanon suggests that he is not prepared to pay such a price.

Mobilizing Public Opposition:

Settlers have now undertaken what they view as their most important challenge—not capturing hilltops but launching a campaign to win the battle for the hearts and minds of the public. In July 1999, 100 activists belonging to the Golan Settlers’ Council adopted a new slogan, “I Am with the Golan.”

Meanwhile, a public campaign has been launched, the likes of which have not been seen in Israel for the past five years, to force the Barak government to rethink its willingness to negotiate with Syria on the basis of withdrawal and settlement evacuation. Failing that, the settlers hope to convince the public to vote no in an eventual referendum. Rabbis have even been enlisted to give religious imprimatur to the rejection of withdrawal.

But while Golan settlers increasingly are ready to cooperate with their counterparts in YESHA (Council of Jewish Communities of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip)—as symbolized by the membership of Katzrin’s mayor in that organization—they remain wary of creating too close an association with the West Bank settlement movement. This wariness is rooted in political and ideological differences, as well as in an appreciation of the public’s less sympathetic attitude toward the West Bank settlers.

An Uphill Struggle:

Even though a recent poll indicates that some 60 percent of Israelis and key partners in Barak’s ruling coalition are opposed to withdrawal, this view is unlikely to prevail against a concerted campaign by the Barak government should it reach an agreement with Syria.

An article in Ha’aretz (20 August 1999) noted that, “[Settler] [l]eaders proclaim militant slogans to the public, but inside they acknowledge that the game is lost.” There are reports of plans to resettle those from the Golan in the Galilee.

The head of the Golan regional council is said to have acknowledged that building plans in a number of settlements have been stopped due to expectations of a withdrawal.

Many, if not most, of the Israelis who answered the call of their government to settle on the Golan appear prepared, despite their misgivings, to accept evacuation. An indelicate headline in Yediot Aharanot (1 January 1999) summarized this sentiment, “We will not move from the Golan,” it screamed. “Well, maybe for $2.5 billion.”

Geoffrey Aronson is Director of the Foundation for Middle East Peace (FMEP). The above text may be used without permission but with proper attribution to the author and to the Palestine Center. This brief does not necessarily reflect the views of the Palestine Center or The Jerusalem Fund.

This information first appeared in Information Brief No. 21, 24 January 2000.