“Impending Lebanese-Israeli Talks,”
by Michael Young

Overview:

19 January 2000—Lebanon is set to begin negotiations with Israel in the wake of the resumption of Syrian-Israeli talks. The Lebanese-Israeli track is governed by UN Security Council Resolution 425, which calls for an unconditional Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon and for peace and security along the border. This would appear to simplify matters, since Israel has officially expressed its willingness to withdraw to the international boundary, while the Lebanese implicitly have accepted the principle of a quiet border area in exchange.

The Lebanese track will be complicated, however, by the fact that Syria, which has great influence over Lebanese affairs, will likely use the Lebanese track as a means of improving its negotiating hand in talks on the future of the Golan. In addition, it appears increasingly certain that Syria is seeking a post-war role for itself in Lebanon and that this, too, will influence progress in the Lebanese-Israeli negotiations. If there is blockage in talks between Syria and Israel, one can expect negative repercussions to be felt on the Lebanese track, and vice versa. Lebanon will not settle with Israel unless Syria does first.

The Negotiating Team:

By the first week of January, the Lebanese had not appointed a negotiating team. In December, the interior minister, Michel al-Murr, announced that he would head the team in his capacity as interim foreign minister. The prime minister, Salim al-Hoss, is titular foreign minister but is considered too high-ranking to negotiate with the Israelis now.

While Murr’s participation was confirmed, it was unclear whether he would participate from the outset, particularly since the Israeli coordinator of the negotiations—Menachem Einan—is a military man. It is probable that members of the army or security services, who are more experienced in such matters, will deal with the technicalities of the negotiations. In that event, a key figure might be the former deputy head of military intelligence, Jamil al-Sayyed, who is currently head of the General Security Service (Amn al-’Am). He has particularly close relations with the Syrians and is trusted by them.

UN Resolution 425:

The paradox of the Lebanese track is that, while Lebanon went to the Madrid conference of 1991 solely to negotiate implementation of Resolution 425, it has gradually abandoned this exclusive intent. Instead, it has become official Lebanese policy that Lebanon will not conclude a peace settlement with Israel until Syria does.

This has had unexpected consequences: when the Israeli prime minister, Ehud Barak, announced that Israel intended to pull its troops out of Lebanon by July 2000, Lebanese officials were alarmed. They understood that such a withdrawal would effectively lead to the demilitarization of southern Lebanon and would leave Syria without leverage over Israel in their talks. That is why they refused to promise that cross-border attacks would end once Israel withdrew. In both word and spirit, this was a transgression of Resolution 425, though it reflected Lebanon’s view that there can be no peace in the south before a full Israeli pullout from the Golan.

This turnaround appears to have harmed Lebanon’s diplomatic credibility, particularly in Washington. Resolution 425 has lost a great deal of its luster, so that both the Americans and the Israelis quietly regard the Lebanese track as merely an adjunct to the Syrian track.

The Issues:

The issues to be negotiated between Lebanon and Israel can be resolved rather easily. The speed of their resolution, however, will be determined in large part by progress on the Syrian-Israeli track. There are essentially five matters to be discussed, and two additional ones that are more problematic:

1. Borders: The Israelis have moved the border fence into Lebanon at various points along the border for strategic advantage. Despite this, Israeli officials have declared that they would pull Israeli troops back to the international frontiers. Ultimately, there appears to be no problem on frontiers, although the Israelis may complicate the issue to push for concessions elsewhere.
   
2. Water: It remains unclear whether Israel has systematically diverted Lebanese waters. It is possible, however, that in the long term a water-sharing agreement will be agreed upon, though one is unlikely soon. A significant share of Lebanon’s waters is wasted, so Lebanon may ultimately see a financial advantage in selling to Israel.
   
3. Security Arrangements: A key issue in the Syrian-Israeli negotiations is security in southern Lebanon. It is the view of both the U.S. and Israel that Syria alone can end the activities of anti-Israeli groups in Lebanon. That is why the Lebanese will probably be compelled to approve a prior agreement reached between the Syrians and Israelis, or at least its main guidelines.
   
4. The South Lebanon Army (SLA): The ease with which the fate of the pro-Israel militia is determined will be decided, again, by the smoothness of the Syrian-Israeli talks. In 1992, the Lebanese government unofficially negotiated with the SLA leader, Antoine Lahd, on how the militia’s rank and file would fare after a settlement, thus revealing a readiness to be flexible. Whatever the outcome, the SLA’s senior officers will almost certainly leave Lebanon.
   
5. The Nature of Peace: Of all the negotiating Arab parties, Lebanon appears to be the most amenable to full peace with Israel. While one should not underestimate the resentment against Israel in certain parts of the country, particularly the south, there is a view that the current economic crisis can be resolved only by adopting an economic system that is open to all, particularly Syria and Israel.

Tougher Issues:

There are two more problematic issues that the Lebanese have vowed to raise, namely reparation payments (reportedly amounting to eight billion dollars), and the future of 368,000 registered Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, most of whom fled Israel in 1948. On reparations, the Israelis are unlikely to agree to discuss the matter as this could set a dangerous precedent in other talks.

Similarly, it will be difficult for the Lebanese to place the Palestinian issue on the negotiating agenda. The Lebanese insist that all refugees must depart. The Israelis refuse to reintegrate them into Israel, while Palestinian officials quietly understand that the Palestinian territories cannot absorb such an influx. Some have suggested a median solution that may involve settlement in Lebanon in exchange for compensation paid to the Lebanese, and conferral of a new status on the refugees, perhaps that of resident foreign laborers.

Syria and Lebanon:

Although largely ignored in public statements, a key ingredient in the current negotiations is Syria’s future in Lebanon. For many reasons—including Lebanon’s roles as a major source of revenue and an outlet for hundreds of thousands of Syrian laborers—the Syrians wish to remain in Lebanon, at least for the moment.

Virtually the only instrument the Syrians possess to persuade Israel and the U.S. to accept this is their role as the main guarantor of stability in Lebanon. That is why the Syrians have always made it clear that they wish to control the fate of armed opponents of Israel in Lebanon—particularly Hezbollah and anti-Arafat Palestinian groupings. The recent tensions in northern Lebanon involving armed Islamist groups can only increase anxieties in Israel and the West as to what might happen if Syrian forces withdraw, though there is no evidence linking Syria to the Islamists’ actions.

Ultimately, the Syrian-Lebanese relationship after a settlement may prove to be of great economic benefit to Lebanon. Syria is a large virgin market whose access is easiest through Lebanon. This should play to Lebanon’s advantage, particularly as Lebanon may emerge as Syria’s economic safety valve in the first years after a settlement.

Michael Young edited the quarterly Lebanon Report, published by the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS) in Beirut, Lebanon. He writes a weekly commentary in Lebanon’s English-language newspaper the Daily Star, and regularly writes for publications in the U.S., Europe, and Lebanon. His views do not necessarily reflect those of the LCPS, The Jerusalem Fund or the Palestine Center. The above text may be used without permission but with proper attribution to the author and to the Palestine Center.

This information first appeared in Information Brief No. 20, 19 January 2000.