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“Human Rights Violations
Resulting from the Oslo Process: Part Two,”
Palestinian National Authority Responsibility: 13 January 2000—While not formally recognized as a state under the Oslo process, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in fact exercises state-like powers through effective control over area A, now 12 percent of the West Bank. (Under the Oslo agreements, Israel presently retains full control over 60 percent of the West Bank and exercises overriding security jurisdiction over an additional 28 percent.) Moreover, the PNA has a sovereign legal identity as a delegated authority of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which enjoys diplomatic relations with over 125 countries. Under the PLO’s 1988 Declaration of Independence, “The State of Palestine declares its commitment to … the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” The PNA has also made frequent public declarations to abide by human rights principles. Under the Oslo process, the PNA was assigned the unenviable task of protecting Israeli security (defined as the personal safety of every Israeli) without sufficient political and economic control to pursue real self-determination or development for the Palestinian population. Even if Israel fully implements the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum of September 1999, the PNA will control only 18.1 percent of the West Bank. The PNA’s inability to fulfill the most basic political and economic demands of the people it claims to represent is one of the major reasons for its widespread violation of human rights. PNA Human Rights Abuses: Abuses by the PNA, especially violations of civil and political rights, have been well documented. In the face of public dissatisfaction and protest over declining living standards, the PNA has clamped down on any public expression of dissent to its policies under Oslo. The recent campaign of repression against 20 prominent Palestinians (nine are members of the elected Palestinian Legislative Council) who signed a petition protesting corruption and political weakness in the PNA is only the most recent and best-publicized example. The PNA’s ubiquitous security apparatus relies on indiscriminate sweeps and arrests, arbitrary detention, military courts and torture. These illegal measures have not only been demanded by Israel in the name of fighting “terrorism,” but also condoned by the same donor governments that fund PNA training programs on the rule of law and good governance. These violations of civil and political rights stem in part from popular opposition to PNA economic policies and practices. According to a 1997 audit conducted by the Legislative Council, PNA officials have mismanaged a staggering 40 percent of foreign aid and revenues. Widespread public corruption at the highest levels has been a major factor causing economic decline, reducing Palestinians’ access to health care, education, and other basic services. Moreover, taking advantage of the closure’s restricted access to external markets, officials close to PNA President Yasser Arafat have established monopolies on most basic goods, leading to sharp price increases. This combination of corruption and monopolies violates the economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR) of Palestinians. ESCR Violations by International Donors: All international actors—not just states—have duties under human rights law regardless of whether or not they have ratified specific treaties. The Universal Declaration mandates that “every individual and every organ of society shall … promote respect for these rights and freedoms.” States and international actors have been found liable for indirect or third-party support of human rights violations by others. For example, the International Court of Justice found the U.S. responsible for abuses committed by Nicaraguan contras backed by the U.S. Under Oslo, international donors have legal obligations. The fact that European and US funders are bankrolling the Oslo process makes them responsible for human rights violations committed with these funds. International donors provide a large share of the PNA’s budget yet only earmark one percent of funds for the judiciary and legislature combined. Most of these funds go to political organs controlled directly by Arafat, and end up supporting repression. Indeed, US Agency for International Development funds have disproportionately financed PNA police and security forces. The astonishing imbalance in foreign funds given to the PNA may be the single largest factor in undermining the rule of law and shaping the increasingly lawless security apparatus in PNA-controlled areas. It is also disturbing that international donors have not demanded an end to the Israeli closure, despite the fact that their aid has been diverted away from real development and toward emergency measures such as temporary job creation, in effect subsidizing the closure. Instead, donors have proposed a model for Palestinian economic development that assumes the continuation of closure. These plans call for more export processing zones like Karni at the Erez military checkpoint on the border of Gaza. Similar to the maquiladoras at the U.S.-Mexico border, these areas allow Israeli and foreign capital to exploit cheap Palestinian labor while maintaining a strict closure confining Palestinians within their enclaves. Structural Flaws in the Oslo Framework: The recent increase in human rights abuses by Israel, the PNA and international donors stems from structural flaws in the Oslo process itself. The most significant flaw is the abandonment of established international law in favor of bilateral negotiations between a strong party and a much weaker one. As a result, the Oslo agreements overwhelmingly reflect Israeli concerns about its political recognition and its security while either dismissing central Palestinian concerns or relegating them to undefined “final status” negotiations. Israel has also exercised its unfettered power to unilaterally dictate the terms of Oslo’s implementation, effectively crippling the Palestinian economy through closure and seizing more Palestinian land and resources without facing public pressure for violating human rights and international law. For its part, the PNA has responded to its political and economic weakness under Oslo by building a formidable security apparatus to repress popular dissent while instituting a form of “governance” marked by cronyism and corruption. The final chapter of the Oslo process is imminent, with final status negotiations due to conclude by the end of this year. The general shape of the final agreement is easy to predict: a politically and economically nonviable Palestinian “state” in isolated enclaves comprising less than 50 percent of Gaza and the West Bank, subject to Israeli control, dependent on international aid and brutally policed by Palestinian security forces. Expected to bring a measure of prosperity and security to a population that had suffered 27 years of military occupation, the Oslo process instead has caused an increase in economic deprivation and human rights violations. The impact can be seen in higher unemployment rates, lower household incomes, restricted access to such basic services as health care and education, and severe limitations on freedom of speech and movement. In essence, Oslo’s structural failure to link peace with human rights has created a situation in which Palestinians now face double repression from Israel and their own nascent government. After Oslo: The dominant public discourse insists that Oslo is the only viable framework for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Opposition to Oslo is equated with opposition to peace, without recognition that any “peace process” built on a foundation of human rights violations and economic exploitation is not sustainable except through increasing levels of repression. A just peace in the region based on human rights and international law offers the best hope for challenging the ongoing economic and political disenfranchisement of the Palestinian people.
Roger Normand is Policy Director of the Center for Economic and Social Rights in New York City. This brief is based on a forthcoming CESR publication entitled Applying Economic and Social Rights in Palestine, Palestine Paper Series 3. The above text may be used without permission but with proper attribution to the author and to the Palestine Center. This brief does not necessarily reflect the views of Palestine Center or The Jerusalem Fund. This information first appeared in Information Brief No. 19, 13 January 2000. |
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