“Syrian Perspectives on the Prospects for Peace,”
by Volker Perthes

Background:

20 December 1999—Even though Syrian-Israeli negotiations have resumed “from where they left off” in 1996, the chances for a successful conclusion of the talks have increased appreciably. From a Syrian perspective, the election of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak opened a window of opportunity—one likely to be closed once Washington becomes fully occupied with U.S. presidential elections. Both the Syrian and the Israeli leaderships have made it clear that they think an agreement can be reached within a couple of months of serious work, and have also indicated their broad agreement on the principles of most of the issues to be negotiated.

These issues include security arrangements (demilitarized zones, observers, early warning), diplomatic and economic normalization, and acess to Syria’s water resources.

Beyond that, Syria has insisted that Israel commit itself to eventual full withdrawal from the Syrian territory it occupied in 1967. Presumably, Barak has accepted “full” withdrawal from the Golan and a frontier based, in principle, on the 1967 border.

Shifts in Syria:

In Syria itself, much has changed since the last negotiations broke down in 1996. Most importantly, while Damascus is still convinced that it can maintain a prolonged stalemate if Israel is not prepared for full withdrawal and other Syrian demands, it no longer wants to postpone a settlement. Earlier fears of peace felt by the Syrian leadership and major segments of the elite have been replaced by the notion that peace is indeed the better or—as Syrians like to put it—the “strategic” option. Such fears were dominant in the 1991-1995 period: Syria felt economically threatened by the grandiose visions of an economically integrated “New Middle East” under Israeli leadership, and also feared a loss of political weight in the post-settlement era.

Owing to a number of factors, these fears have lessened today. Israel no longer “threatens” Syria with all-embracing economic integration projects. Additionally, in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (the “Barcelona process”), the European Union has offered Syria support for making its economy fit for a new, post-settlement regional division of labor. Moreover, the Euro-Mediterranean integration scheme (into which Israel and Syria have entered as equal partners) promises Syria the maintenance of its politically important position in the regional system.

The Succession Challenge:

Domestic reasons for Syria to seek peace include impending processes of change and succession in the Syrian leadership. President Hafez al-Assad, along with the majority of the regime’s elite, has reached retirement age, and the entire Syrian leadership is facing a generational shift within a couple of years. At the very top, Assad is training his son, Bashar, to step into his shoes. Assad is convinced, however, along with many of his compatriots that he is the best negotiator Syria can have, and that an agreement that he concludes will achieve the necessary legitimacy to ensure a stable peace.

Beyond that, it would be difficult for any successor to start his tenure by negotiating peace with Israel. Bashar, or any other successor, will first have to concentrate on building and consolidating his own power base, including in it, most probably, political forces that are anything but enthusiastic about peace with Israel. Thus, if the succession question becomes acute before an agreement is reached, a peace settlement will likely be postponed for several years.

The Challenge of Economic and Political Reform:

There is also a linkage between the peace process and domestic economic and political reform. Syria today faces formidable challenges, particularly on the economic front:

1. There is the challenge of demographic growth and the related need to create jobs and maintain the quality of the basic social infrastructure. While some 200,000 persons are entering the job market annually, the public and private sectors together can provide, at best, 50,000 or so new jobs per year;
   
2. Syria’s oil resources are limited. While Syria benefited from the 1999 oil price rise, it has to prepare for a future with less oil income. Syria’s own production cannot be raised over current levels. Its major fields most probably will be depleted within the next decade, and domestic consumption is on the increase. Therefore, by 2010 or so, Syria is likely to become a net oil importer again;
   
3. As some 60 percent of Syria’s exports are based on oil, the country will likely face increasing balance-of-payments deficits, economic recession and, most probably, decreasing standards of living.

All the above add up to the need to develop export-oriented industries and to encourage local and foreign business to invest in long-term economic ventures. This is a technical and, even more so, a political, administrative and legal challenge. Syria will have to reform its tax and currency laws, permit modern banking practices, establish a stock exchange, privatize some of its public-sector conglomerates and, most importantly, create the secure legal environment necessary to attract and reassure potential investors.

Reform Deferred:

Aware of the need to embark on substantial economic reforms, the Syrian leadership has had serious reform projects prepared for some time. They remain in the drawer. The fact is that no substantial reforms will be undertaken, at least not under the present regime, until Syria’s main foreign policy and security problem is solved, i.e., before an agreement with Israel. As long as the peace process is pending, Assad does not want to offend those segments of his own political base with a vested interest in maintaining present socio-economic structures.

Moreover, he is much too preoccupied with the peace process and the succession question to spend time and energy on economic reform matters.

The same applies to the need for political adjustments. For some time, there has been discussion about the need to reform the political system-including reviewing the ruling Ba’ath party program and introducing a party law-to allow a modicum of political competition. None of this is likely to happen, however, before the peace process is concluded. Cautious by nature, Assad and his regime are not going to loosen political control as long as the state of external confrontation persists. A breakdown of the peace process, a major crisis in Lebanon with possible repercussions in Syria, or even direct military clashes between Syria and Israel cannot be excluded.

Contending Camps:

While Syria is an authoritarian state, its elite is not as monolithic as it is sometimes depicted. Different “camps” exist with respect to the peace process and the issue of economic and political reform. Generally speaking, those likely to lose in a more liberal economic environment are also most critical of what they see as a “rush” for peace. This camp consists primarily of the public sector bureaucracy, the trade unions, party functionaries, and a large part of Syria’s state-employed intelligentsia.

By contrast, those who advocate an end to the state of confrontation and support economic and administrative reforms include not only private business people and some liberal intellectuals, but also, astonishingly perhaps, important parts of the security establishment. The latters’ professional concern is that domestic risks will increase, including the danger of social unrest, if the country’s economic problems are not tackled. They also fear that unless a peace treaty is achieved under the present regime domestic political equations could change, particularly in favor of Islamist forces. Peace, in their analysis, would help to preserve the secular character of the system.

Dr. Volker Perthes is in charge of the Middle East/Mediterranean program at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (Research Institute for International Affairs), in Berlin. His works include: Staat und Gesellschaft in Syrien (1990); The Political Economy of Syria (1995); and (as editor) Scenarios for Syria: Socio-Economic and Political Choices (1998). The above text may be used without permission but with proper attribution to the author and to the Palestine Center. This Information Brief does not necessarily reflect the views of Palestine Center or the Jerusalem Fund.

This information first appeared in Information Brief No. 16, 20 December 1999.