“A View from Israel: The Palestinian-Israeli Final Status Talks,”
by Roni Ben Efrat

A Poor Beginning:

28 October 1999—On 13 September 1999, Israelis and Palestinians re-started the final status negotiations, which—according to an agreement signed at Sharm el-Sheikh on 4 September 1999—are to conclude within one year. Even by the usual standard of such affairs, the opening ceremony was formal, dry, and lifeless. It did not compare to a sumptuous private dinner held three days later in the villa of Israeli millionaire Jean Friedman in plush Savion near Tel Aviv.

At the table, on the Palestinian side, sat Palestinian Authority (PA) President Yasser Arafat, Abu Mazen (Palestine Liberation Organization Executive Committee Secretary), and Yasser Abed Rabbo (PA Minister of Information and Culture). The other guests included Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, Ami Ayalon, Yossi Ginossar, and Dani Yatom. Ayalon heads the Shin Bet. Ginossar made a name for himself in its torture chambers. Yatom, who lost his job as Mossad chief after bungling the assassination of Jordanian Hamas leader Khaled Meshal, is now Barak’s right-hand man. Bon appetit!

By his choice of dinner companions, Barak signaled to Arafat exactly who among his aides would be authorized to negotiate in his name. He is already looking toward agreement on a framework for the permanent status, which is supposed to be ready by February 2000. Barak wants both to soften Arafat up and to diminish U.S. involvement. He also wants to ensure that the final accord will have a legal status superseding all UN resolutions so that, in signing it, the Palestinians will explicitly give up any further claims.

Arafat’s Bottom Line:

The most important issue for Arafat is territory. That is why he insisted on the full implementation of the Wye River Memorandum. Once that agreement is carried out, it will give him partial control over 41 percent of the West Bank, dispelling some of the uncertainty that riddles his regime. For much remains “up in the air.” The PA’s territory still consists of non-contiguous “islands.” The government is chaotic. The PA’s international legal status remains unclear. In short, Arafat requires a definite territory that he can tax and rule.

We can only hazard a guess as to how much territory former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was willing to cede to Arafat. Regarding the fate of the Jewish settlements, it is clear that Barak has a different view from that of his mentor. Rabin drew a distinction between “political” settlements, which he considered dispensable, and “security” settlements, which he said must remain. Today, one hears nothing of such a distinction. The assassination of Rabin taught the Labor Party to take the right wing into account. With the National Religious Party in the government, all the settlements have been deemed vital to Israel’s “security.” This redefinition reduces the danger of conflict between Israelis but limits the amount of territory that Israel is prepared to cede.

Arafat, it appears, has reconciled himself to this state of affairs. If Israel keeps the settlements, however, it will have little spare land to give up in the new negotiations, except the arid stretch of the Jordan Valley, which makes up about one-fifth of the West Bank. Since 1967, the Labor Party has regarded this as a vital buffer against hostile Arab lands to the east. Lately, nevertheless, Israeli officials have floated the idea of ceding it —on paper, that is, over a period of, say, 20 years. During this period, Israel will remain in the valley, while the Palestinians will possess a document telling them they have gained it back. Despite such difficulties, the two sides will probably reach an agreement on territory.

Israel’s Priority:

Israel’s main concern is that the new global market may pass it by. Given its need for a major economic breakthrough, Israel has no interest in maintaining direct rule over three million Palestinians. It is much more attractive to foreign investors if one possesses a “sphere of influence.” For this reason, Israel will not be ruffled if and when the PA achieves statehood. Meanwhile, Israel will be able to annex a goodly stretch. It will continue to supervise the passages to and from Egypt and Jordan and, in short, will maintain comprehensive power. The day Arafat accepts a solution like this, the territories under his aegis will begin heating up toward explosion.

Non-Negotiable Issues:

The roughly 400,000 Jewish settlers in Palestinian territory (including some 190,000 in East Jerusalem) constitute a recipe for disaster. And then there are the problems that cannot be solved even nominally: the destiny of Jerusalem, which concerns the whole Muslim world, and the issue of the refugees, which lies at the heart of the Palestinian tragedy. On these two topics, Israel enunciates two unambiguous “no’s”: Jerusalem will not be divided, and the refugees will not return to their former homes within its borders.

Six years ago, when Arafat agreed to omit these issues from negotiations on interim arrangements, he, in effect, gave up on them. He knew he would not have enough cards later to impose his will. And yet, according to a Palestinian source close to the refugee issue, Arafat will never agree to cancel the right of return, or accede to Israel’s demand that the refugees receive citizenship in the Arab lands where they reside.

Nor will he give up the claim to Jerusalem. Knowing that his time may be short, he will take care to avoid the stigma of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, remembered today in the Arab world as the man who sold himself and his country to America. Arafat cannot win on these issues, but he will try to avoid appearing a traitor. As a result, although the permanent arrangement may define borders, other topics will likely remain open.

Finding a “Solution”:

Israel, for its part, will happily help the PA president not to decide. Barak knows that whatever agreement is reached will depend on what Arafat is able and willing to market to his people in his lifetime. The way out will be to break the “final” accord into sections: some things will indeed be finalized, others deferred. The problem will be to ensure permanence for the parts that can be agreed upon.

Chaim Ramon, the Israeli minister responsible for issues concerning Jerusalem, speaks of a series of long-term interim arrangements containing sufficient permanent elements to lend the agreement an overall feel of finality. Oslo architect Yossi Beilin, now Minister of Justice, formulates matters in a rosier light. He speaks of a permanent status agreement with “continuing elements.”

It is not at all likely, then, that the final accord between Israel and the Palestinians will be one of historical reconciliation. At Oslo, Israel showed its preference for all of Palestine (de facto), rather than a fair (albeit still unjust) partition. Here it missed a rare opportunity to heal, at small cost, the enormous injustice it inflicted on the Palestinian people in 1948.

The Oslo agreement is the product of a unipolar world. The problem of Palestine, like other unsolved national questions, will not be solved within this global framework. We ought not merely sit and wait, however, for a change in the distribution of power. We must work to change it—first of all by insisting on the truths that the supporters of Oslo have tried to ignore. Six million Palestinians still require a fair solution.

Roni Ben Efrat is the editor of the Jerusalem-based magazine Challenge, a bimonthly publication focusing on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For a free trial copy, please send an e-mail to oda@netvision.net.il. The above text may be used without permission but with proper attribution to the author and to the Palestine Center. This Information Brief does not necessarily reflect the views of the Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine or The Jerusalem Fund.

This information first appeared in Information Brief No. 13, 28 October 1999.