Even if the experts are correct, the strategic placement of the settlements, protected by nearby army bases and connected by roads bypassing areas of Palestinian population concentration, will render impossible the achievement of Palestinian territorial contiguity or economic independence.

Refugees:

All told, some 3.6 million Palestinians—almost half of the estimated worldwide Palestinian population of seven million—are now UN-registered refugees. One-third of these refugees, who remain stateless, live in destitute conditions in 59 overcrowded camps in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, the West Bank, and Gaza.

Israelis argue that the return to Israel of the 750,000 Palestinians (and their descendants) driven from their homes during the 1948 war will undermine the demographic balance of the Jewish state. International law and numerous UN resolutions support the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes. Israel may consider the return to PA-controlled territories of some of the 400,000-500,000 Palestinians (and their descendants) expelled from the West Bank in June 1967, but it refuses to discuss the return of the 1948 refugees.

Some 91 percent of Palestinians polled in late September 1999 in the West Bank and Gaza oppose the creation of a Palestinian state in exchange for the right to return. Yet the Israeli media reports that Israel is exploring the permanent settlement of Palestinian refugees where they now reside, or in third countries.

The host countries, especially Lebanon, have rejected this option, as have an overwhelming majority of the refugees themselves. Payment of compensation to the 1948 and 1967 refugees, whose lost property is valued in the hundreds of billions of dollars, will not satisfy the many refugees who insist on restitution—the actual restoration of their property to them.

Borders:

The PA currently exercises civilian and military control over only 10 percent of the Occupied Territories. Israel continues to restrict the movement of Palestinians in the remaining 90 percent—among the landlocked “bantustans” of PA-controlled territory that dot the West Bank and Gaza—and controls all border crossings with neighboring states.

In the permanent status negotiations, Israel is expected to insist on continued control of borders and the so-called “safe passages” linking PA-controlled territory, as well as over ports, airports, and airspace.

Jerusalem:

Israel insists that Jerusalem is the “undivided” capital of Israel, while the PA position is that Jerusalem should become the shared capital of Israel and a new Palestinian state. Related issues include: the civil, social, political, and economic rights of disenfranchised Palestinian residents of Jerusalem; the boundaries of the city, which Israeli authorities have expanded a number of times since 1967; access to Jerusalem by millions of Palestinians currently living under Israeli travel restrictions; the status of Jewish settlements within Jerusalem on land confiscated from Palestinians; and the fate of property in West and East Jerusalem expropriated during the 1948 and 1967 wars.

An overwhelming majority of West Bank and Gaza Palestinians are opposed to making Jerusalem the unified capital of Israel and to the proposal that Abu Dis, a Palestinian village on the outskirts of East Jerusalem, become the capital of a future Palestinian state. On the Israeli side, public opinion on the question of Jerusalem betrays more flexibility than the official Israeli position indicates. According to University of Maryland Professor Jerome Segal, 39 percent of Israeli Jews recently polled believe that Palestinians have some legitimate rights with respect to Jerusalem—a percentage that rose to 55 percent among those who identify with the Labor Party.

Security:

In any permanent settlement, Israel is likely to seek continuation of the status quo: namely the PA’s guarantee of Israel’s security against Palestinian violence, without providing reciprocal assurances regarding Palestinian security from Israeli violence.

Israel is also likely to assume unchallenged freedom of action in defending itself against all external threats while insisting on limiting the military capacity of any emerging Palestinian state to a small, lightly armed police force, and demanding that the Palestinian state not sign military alliances with third countries. The PA position on demilitarization is not clear.

Other Issues:

Though not clearly specified in the DOP, other permanent status issues include access to water and economic relations. Israel currently consumes more than 80 percent of Palestinian groundwater. This illegal exploitation of Palestinian water since 1967 permits Israelis to consume more than four times as much water as Palestinians on a per capita basis. The PA wants to regain full control over its water resources, and to receive compensation for water already consumed.

According to Ma’ariv (22 October 1999), Barak intended to maintain control over Palestinian “inshore” waters. Water expert Thomas Stauffer argues that Israel will compromise on water only if it receives compensation—as it did when it withdrew from Sinai after the 1967 war, and the U.S. paid Israel for “giving up” the Egyptian oil fields.

As for economic relations, Barak advocates complete physical and economic separation of the two populations. Mohammed Shtayyeh, Director-General of the Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction, argues that this will have disastrous consequences: “86 percent of Palestinian imports come from or go through Israel, while 56 percent of Palestinian exports go to or pass through Israel.” Moreover, “more than 100,000 Palestinian laborers work in Israel each day” (Jerusalem Post, 20 October 1999).

Khaled Mansour is Chief Correspondent for the Middle East News Agency in Washington, D.C. The above text may be used without permission but with proper attribution to the author and to the Palestine Center. This Information Brief does not necessarily reflect the views of the Palestine Center or The Jerusalem Fund.