“Palestinian Public Opinion about the Peace Process, 1993-1999,”
by Khalil Shikaki

 

Summary:

26 October 1999—A majority of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza support the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. When Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization signed the Declaration of Principles (DOP) in September 1993, most Palestinians had high expectations of achieving a mutually acceptable and lasting political solution. But years of stalemate, slow progress, and continued Israeli settlement construction have reduced Palestinian optimism and have contributed, at times, to rising support for violence against Israelis.

Rather than viewing violence as an alternative to diplomacy, some Palestinians regard violence as a supporting tactic to improve the Palestinian negotiating position and to force Israel to stop creating facts on the ground that prejudge the outcome of negotiations.

The Early Period:

In September 1993, 65 percent of West Bank and Gaza Palestinians supported the peace process. Moreover, 57 percent were willing to amend the Palestinian National Charter as requested by Israel, while most (65 percent) expected the process to improve economic conditions in the Occupied Territories. The 25 February 1994 massacre of 29 Palestinians praying at the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron by American-born settler Baruch Goldstein reduced to 17 percent Palestinian support for an unconditional return to the negotiating table.

Uncertainty about Israel’s intentions and prospects for establishing a Palestinian state led most Palestinians to support both continued negotiations and violence against Israelis. In November 1994, support for violence stood at 57 percent.


Palestinian Response to Progress:

In the wake of Israeli troop withdrawals from portions of the Occupied Territories, Palestinian support for the peace process gradually increased in early 1996 to about 80 percent. At the same time, support for violence dropped dramatically to about 20 percent. Survey data indicate an important psychological shift as Palestinian support for nationalist and Islamist opposition groups dropped by half to less than 20 percent, while support for the mainstream Fateh faction remained high at about 45 percent.


Palestinian Response to Stalemate:

The May 1996 election of Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu disrupted the peace process and reversed the emerging trend of Palestinian support for it. Yet, significantly, during Netanyahu’s government, from May 1996 to May 1999, support for the peace process never fell below 60 percent.

At the same time, almost all other peace indicators began to suffer. Palestinian support for the Palestinian National Council’s (PNC) decision to amend the National Charter dropped in June 1996 to 48 percent, and in January 1999, only 37 percent supported the PNC’s decision to affirm the earlier amendment.

Trust in the Israeli government never exceeded six percent during 1998, while the percentage of those who believed that the Israeli people were serious about the peace process did not exceed 27 percent. Belief that the peace process would result in the establishment of a Palestinian state declined in August 1998 to 37 percent. Faith that the two sides would reach an agreement on final status issues suffered similar reversals, retreating from 44 percent in June 1996 to 31 percent in June and October 1998.


Rising Palestinian Support for Violence:

Support for armed attacks against Israelis rose to high levels during 1997-98. One month before the signing of the Wye River Memorandum (Wye), support for violence reached 51 percent. With the signing of Wye in October 1998, support for violence dropped to 41 percent, but rose again to 53 percent in January 1999 after Netanyahu suspended its implementation.

In January 1999, support was equally widespread among men and women of all age groups and educational levels, and among residents of cities, villages, towns, and refugee camps, reflecting deep anger about Israel’s failure to honor its peace commitments. Approval of violence did vary, however, by political affiliation, with Hamas and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine supporters showing strongest approval (76 and 70 percent respectively), and Fateh supporters showing the weakest (47 percent).

Increasing support for violence in January 1999 did not mean that most Palestinians had given up on diplomacy. On the contrary, 60 percent supported negotiations, while only 14 percent supported “armed struggle,” and 16 percent supported a return to the “Intifada.” In other words, Palestinian public opinion approved of diplomacy as a strategic choice while it supported armed attacks as a tactical response to perceived Israeli intransigence and broken promises.


Opinion on Final Status Issues:

Despite growing disappointment with the peace process, many Palestinians were willing to accept a compromise final status settlement. In April 1997, 43 percent of Palestinians supported, and 53 percent opposed, a plan calling for:

  1. the establishment of a sovereign, but disarmed, Palestinian state in 95 percent of the West Bank and the whole of Gaza;
  2. the actual return of refugees to a Palestinian state without renouncing the right of return to homes inside Israel;
  3. the continued presence of some settlers under Palestinian sovereignty;
  4. limited and temporary Israeli military presence and joint patrols along the Jordan River; and
  5. a united Jerusalem under Israeli control but with the understanding that the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem would revert to Palestinian sovereignty at a later stage and serve as the Palestinian capital.

 

Palestinian Response to Barak:

If the Palestinian response to Netanyahu was relatively predictable, the ascendance of Israel Prime Minister Ehud Barak elicited a more complicated reaction. Despite the fact that most Palestinians did not count on the May 1999 Israeli elections, some 19 percent believed in April 1999 that election of a leftist candidate was better for the peace process. Barak’s victory, however, did not bring about immediate change in public opinion.

Indeed, most believed that he would not implement Wye and that his settlement policy would not differ from Netanyahu’s. Nonetheless, in September 1999, support for the peace process rose to 75 percent and support for violence dropped to 36 percent. Yet most Palestinians remained skeptical about Barak’s commitment to implement the peace agreements, and most continued to doubt the achievement of a mutually acceptable permanent settlement.

 

Professor Khalil Shikaki is the former director of the Center for Palestine Research and Studies in the West Bank city of Nablus. The above text may be used without permission but with proper attribution to the author and to Palestine Center. This brief does not necessarily reflect the views of Palestine Center or The Jerusalem Fund.

This information first appeared in Information Brief No. 11, 26 October 1999.