The Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum:

The Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum* reaffirmed Israel’s commitment, first made by former Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu at Wye, to reduce the area of the West Bank under exclusive Israeli control from 72 percent to 59 percent, and to transfer the remaining 41 percent to Areas A and B. Sharm el-Sheikh’s timetable, which remains independent of progress on final status issues, divided the second withdrawal called for in Oslo II into three phases instead of the two phases outlined in Wye. If Israel implements Sharm el-Sheikh fully, Palestinians will regain exclusive control over only 18.1 percent of the Occupied Territories.

In partial fulfillment of the agreement, Israel released 199 Palestinian prisoners on 9 September 1999. The following day, Israel completed the first of three Sharm el-Sheikh FRDs, transferring seven percent (385 square kilometers) of Area C land to Area B. While Israel was required to open a safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank by 1 October, and to allow construction to begin on a Gaza seaport, Israeli authorities now predict the passageway will open by late October. Israel missed an 8 October deadline to release another 150 prisoners. Sharm el-Sheikh also requires Israel to “aim” to free an unspecified number by the end of the year.

The Territory at Stake:

Wye was the first redeployment accord in which a map did not form part of the official agreement. Nevertheless, Wye provided assurances that its first FRD would involve land mainly from the northern part of the West Bank, its second FRD from the Ramallah area, and its third from around Hebron.

By including two separate desert-like areas in the hilly region northeast of Hebron as “nature reserves” in the planned but never-implemented third Wye FRD, Israel “met” U.S. demands for a transfer of 13 percent of the West Bank to the Palestinians. The choice of this territory, favored by the settler movement, enabled Netanyahu to avoid reducing the area of Israeli control north, east, and south of Ramallah and near Nablus—areas with numerous Israeli settlements. Many Israelis, including Prime Minister Ehud Barak, opposed transferring the areas southeast of Bethlehem as a violation of the Allon Plan, which outlines Israel’s security requirements.

Like Wye, Sharm el-Sheikh did not include a map detailing the areas to be transferred by Israel from Area C to Areas A and B and omitted mention of specific territories from which Israeli troops will redeploy. Many observers expected Wye’s never-implemented second FRD from five percent of the West Bank to occur around Ramallah. Because of the density of settlements, however, Barak deemed that far fewer than 300 square kilometers of Area C in that region were suitable for transfer.

Accordingly, under the first Sharm el-Sheikh FRD, Barak returned only 60 square kilometers in the critical Ramallah area—less than one percent of the West Bank—and focused most transfers on the region south of Nablus and Hebron. In order to offset the meager transfer around Ramallah, Barak offered lands just outside the southeastern periphery of Jerusalem, east of the proposed Road #80.

Palestinian Authority (PA) President Yasser Arafat did manage to receive territory around Nablus that increased the PA’s territorial contiguity within, but not between, the regions of Nablus, Hebron, and Jenin. But he conceded the further postponement of the scheduled transfers, as well as the assertion of increased PA authority around Ramallah, as was anticipated after Wye, not to mention around Jerusalem and Bethlehem.

Quality of Land Versus Quantity:

Barak, following his election in April 1999, proposed a solution first outlined by Ariel Sharon, then serving as Minister of Defense in the Netanyahu government. Sharon, in discussions with Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), the secretary of the PLO Executive Committee, and others, had offered to transfer “quality” territory that would increase the territorial contiguity of the Palestinian areas.

In return, Sharon asked the Palestinians to reduce their demand for “quantity”—from 13 percent to less than ten percent of the land pledged by Israel in fulfillment of Oslo II—and to agree to postpone Wye’s third FRD. Like Sharon, Barak failed to win Palestinian approval of a reduction in the amount of land scheduled for the FRD, and, according to Palestinian land experts, also failed to improve the quality of the lands Israel transferred as of 10 September 1999.

Impact on Settlements:

Since the original redeployments called for in the May 1994 Cairo Agreement, links between settlements in the affected areas and Israel proper have been enhanced by the construction of a network of roads “bypassing” Palestinian areas. Twelve new bypass roads are in various stages of planning and construction, although work on the $70 million program has been impeded by Washington’s refusal to supply the $1.2 billion aid package promised as part of Wye. The U.S. government froze this aid when the peace process broke down in late 1998, and Congress recently passed up an opportunity to advance the money.

In addition, Israel is establishing new military bases throughout the West Bank, according to the Israeli newspaper Yediot Aharanot: “The intention is not to leave isolated settlements in the heart of Palestinian areas without an army base nearby. The camps to be established, therefore, will separate the territory under Palestinian control from the settlements.”

The $300 million cost of these military deployments “will arrive as American aid and has been planned to the last detail,” according to the Israel Defense Forces chief of staff. Barak, like his predecessors, opposes placing any territorial constraints on the settlements’ well-being, at least at this stage.